Les marchés de l’électricité et du gaz naturel assurent l’approvisionnement en énergie des économies modernes. Ils alimentent la production industrielle et les services de transport ainsi que les infrastructures numériques et permettent de répondre aux besoins énergétiques quotidiens des ménages. Parce que l’électricité et le gaz sont des intrants nécessaires à presque toutes les activités économiques, la manière dont ces marchés fonctionnent a des incidences bien au-delà du secteur de l’énergie.

Cassie Castle, Département des affaires économiques de l’OCDE

English version / lire en anglais

Un large corpus de données montre que des marchés de l’énergie bien organisés et concurrentiels peuvent imposer une discipline des prix, renforcer les incitations à l’investissement et stimuler l’innovation. La concurrence oblige les entreprises à gagner en efficience, à adopter de nouvelles technologies et à satisfaire les besoins des consommateurs. Lorsqu’elle est faible, leurs motivations sont moindres (OCDE, 2022). Le manque de concurrence se traduit certes par une augmentation de la facture énergétique, mais il a aussi des répercussions plus larges sur les entreprises, les ménages et les résultats économiques.

Selon un nouveau document de travail de l’OCDE fondé sur les indicateurs de réglementation des marchés de produits (RMP) de l’OCDE, les pays ont déjà engagé des réformes importantes en faveur de la concurrence. Pendant une grande partie du XX^e siècle, les secteurs de l’électricité et du gaz naturel étaient principalement structurés autour de monopoles d’État verticalement intégrés, et ceux-ci n’étaient guère incités à rechercher des gains d’efficience ou à innover. Une énorme vague de réformes de libéralisation, en particulier dans les années 90, a transformé ce modèle. De nombreux pays ont pris des mesures importantes pour séparer les différentes activités de réseau organisées en monopole, réglementer l’accès des tiers aux infrastructures et ouvrir à de nouveaux entrants les marchés de la production et de la fourniture au détail.

En dépit de ces avancées, des disparités notables subsistent. Le nouveau document de travail de l’OCDE a pour objet d’examiner l’état actuel du cadre réglementaire régissant les marchés de l’électricité et du gaz naturel dans 50 pays. Les auteurs évaluent dans quelle mesure ces cadres favorisent la concurrence en abaissant les barrières à l’entrée, en garantissant un accès non discriminatoire à des services de réseau monopolistiques et en réduisant les coûts associés à un changement de fournisseur tout au long de la chaîne d’approvisionnement. Prenant appui sur la dernière mise à jour des indicateurs de réglementation des marchés de produits (RMP) de l’OCDE, ils montrent que, si la libéralisation s’est généralisée sur le plan juridique, des lacunes fondamentales au niveau réglementaire continuent d’entraver la pleine et entière concrétisation des avantages procurés par la concurrence (voir le graphique 1).

Indicateur RMP du secteur de l’énergie : derniers résultats

Quatre problématiques se dégagent :

Premièrement, dans certains pays, l’exploitation par des monopoles d’infrastructures de réseau – réseaux de transport et de distribution – restent très peu séparée des activités ouvertes à la concurrence, comme la production, le stockage et la fourniture au détail. Dans le secteur de l’électricité, environ 10 % des pays étudiés imposent uniquement une séparation comptable, voire aucune séparation. Pour celui du gaz naturel, il en va de même dans environ 16 % des pays. Lorsque l’intégration verticale perdure, les entreprises ont à la fois intérêt à favoriser leurs propres filiales et à restreindre l’accès de leurs concurrents aux réseaux essentiels. Le recours à des modalités plus strictes de dissociation, comme une séparation juridique ou capitalistique, offre des garde-fous plus solides et est largement reconnu comme une pratique exemplaire.

Deuxièmement, un certain nombre de pays continuent de restreindre le choix entre plusieurs fournisseurs d’énergie qui s’offre aux ménages et aux petites entreprises, et conservent une réglementation des prix de détail de large portée, allant au-delà des aides ciblées octroyées aux ménages vulnérables. C’est généralement ce que l’on constate lorsque le marché n’est pas encore totalement ouvert à la concurrence. Lorsque des obstacles à l’entrée demeurent, lorsque les coûts d’un changement de fournisseur sont élevés ou lorsque les marchés de gros ne fonctionnent pas bien, une libéralisation prématurée peut avoir des effets préjudiciables aux consommateurs. Les inquiétudes autour de la volatilité des prix peuvent toutefois expliquer en partie le maintien de tarifs de détail réglementés, parfois en parallèle d’offres de marché, en particulier depuis la crise énergétique de 2021-2023. Les amples fluctuations de prix ont incité certains pays à conserver la réglementation des prix de détail applicables aux petits consommateurs, voire à en élargir la portée, même sur des marchés par ailleurs bien développés. Cette situation paradoxale est analysée dans le document. Si le contrôle des prix peut être une garantie de stabilité en période de tensions, les mesures prises pour une durée indéterminée risquent de fausser les signaux-prix, d’affaiblir les pressions concurrentielles avec le temps et d’amoindrir les avantages découlant de l’ouverture des marchés.

Troisièmement, même lorsque les consommateurs sont libres de choisir, nombre d’entre eux ne disposent pas des outils nécessaires pour se comporter en véritables acteurs des marchés de détail. La concurrence sur ces marchés ne peut leur être véritablement bénéfique que s’ils peuvent accéder aux informations nécessaires pour prendre des décisions éclairées au moment où ils choisissent leur fournisseur. Dans la plupart des pays, les fournisseurs sont tenus de faire figurer sur les factures mensuelles des données détaillées sur la consommation et le coût, mais rares sont ceux qui proposent également des outils permettant de comparer les prix en toute impartialité. Le faible taux d’équipement en compteurs intelligents impose aussi une limite à l’accès des consommateurs à des informations utiles pour comprendre leurs propres habitudes de consommation et opter pour le tarif le plus adapté à leur situation. Faute d’un accompagnement actif destiné à aider les consommateurs à faire des choix éclairés, le temps et les efforts nécessaires pour comparer les offres, et éventuellement changer de fournisseur, représentent un frein, même lorsque des offres moins chères existent. Il est primordial de réduire ces coûts de changement de fournisseur pour que la concurrence fonctionne dans la pratique.

Quatrièmement, sur les marchés de l’électricité, la flexibilité du côté de la demande est un facteur de plus en plus important pour la stabilité du réseau et l’efficacité économique parce qu’elle facilite la gestion des pointes de demande et l’intégration de l’électricité renouvelable variable. Il n’existe cependant pas partout des dispositifs d’offres d’ajustement explicites. Environ 21 % des pays étudiés ne les autorisent pas, et parmi ceux qui les autorisent, approximativement un tiers en limitent le bénéfice aux utilisateurs industriels, de sorte que les petits consommateurs, en particulier les ménages, en sont largement exclus. En élargir l’accès aux ménages nécessite le déploiement généralisé de compteurs intelligents, afin de pouvoir appliquer des tarifications dynamiques en fonction du temps d’utilisation, ainsi que de cadres réglementaires autorisant une tarification dynamique et la participation des agrégateurs. Lorsque ces conditions sont réunies, les ménages peuvent réduire leur consommation pendant les périodes de pointe, et alléger ainsi leur facture d’énergie, tout en limitant les coûts du système et en améliorant la stabilité du réseau.

Ces conclusions renvoient à l’inachèvement du programme de réformes. La libéralisation juridique a considérablement progressé, mais des lacunes structurelles empêchent encore les pays de recueillir les fruits de l’instauration d’une concurrence effective. Il devient de plus en plus urgent de combler ces lacunes à mesure que la part de la production d’électricité renouvelable et décentralisée dans les systèmes énergétiques s’accroît. L’intégration d’une offre variable exige une plus grande flexibilité passant par la réactivité de la demande et la lisibilité des signaux-prix. La concurrence sur les marchés est fondamentale pour que ces ajustements puissent s’opérer efficacement. Mener à bien le processus de réforme n’implique donc non seulement d’améliorer les résultats dans le secteur de l’énergie, mais aussi de favoriser l’évolution vers un système énergétique plus résilient concourant à la productivité et à la croissance à l’échelle de l’économie toute entière.

Bibliographie

Castle, C. et C. Varriale (2026), « Building competitive energy markets : Regulatory insights from the OECD PMR indicators », Documents de travail du Département des affaires économiques de l’OCDE, n° 1863, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f47862f5-en.

OCDE (2022), « Competition in Energy Markets », Documents des tables rondes sur la politique de la concurrence, n° 290, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/46d7c123-en.

Pour de plus amples informations, veuillez consulter la page web de l’OCDE consacrée à la réglementation des marchés de produits (RMP) : https://www.oecd.org/fr/themes/reglementation-du-marche-des-produits.html

Les économies de l’OCDE voient s’ouvrir de nouvelles perspectives de croissance, mais surgir aussi des défis. Il sera primordial de tirer le meilleur parti de ces opportunités et de relever ces défis pour redynamiser la productivité et assurer un niveau de vie plus élevé aux générations futures.

Par Stefano Scarpetta, Chef économiste de l’OCDE et Représentant de l’OCDE au G20/G7 pour les affaires financières

Dans la zone OCDE et au-delà, les fondements de la croissance économique sont mis à rude épreuve. Au cours des deux dernières décennies, la croissance de la productivité du travail a nettement ralenti dans la plupart des pays. Ce fléchissement s’explique par la conjonction de divers goulets d’étranglement structurels : atonie de l’investissement des entreprises, perte de dynamisme des entreprises, ralentissement de la diffusion des technologies et affaiblissement du rythme d’accumulation du capital humain. La croissance de l’emploi a bien résisté, mais de nombreux pays doivent faire face au grand défi du vieillissement démographique qui aura des effets sur la capacité de la main-d’œuvre à soutenir la croissance.

Dans le même temps, les progrès rapides de l’intelligence artificielle et des technologies numériques ouvrent la perspective d’une nouvelle vague de gains de productivité s’inscrivant dans la durée. La concrétisation des gains de productivité durables que laissent envisager les nouvelles technologies dépendra essentiellement des cadres de politique structurelle.

Cette première édition de la publication intitulée Les fondements de la croissance et de la compétitivité arrive à un moment charnière. La dynamique des réformes structurelles s’est essoufflée dans de nombreux pays de l’OCDE, mais il est de plus en plus nécessaire que les pays restent compétitifs et résilients dans un paysage mondial caractérisé par des transformations structurelles et des chocs géopolitiques et commerciaux sans précédent. Pour aider les pays à faire face à ces enjeux, sont présentés dans le rapport des outils pratiques à l’intention des responsables de l’action publique, notamment une plateforme en ligne complète de données, élaborée dans le cadre d’un dialogue itératif avec les autorités nationales, permettant d’identifier les goulets d’étranglement structurels et de dégager des priorités sur mesure en matière de réforme pour 48 pays.

La pérennité de la prospérité est conditionnée par la solidité de l’ancrage des conditions qui la favorisent : un capital humain de qualité, des institutions robustes, une gouvernance efficace, des infrastructures fiables, un approvisionnement énergétique abordable et sûr et la stabilité macroéconomique.

Dans tous les pays, le renforcement des systèmes de compétences et de l’apprentissage tout au long de la vie apparaît comme l’une des priorités de réforme les plus fréquemment citées dans ce rapport, priorité dont la finalité est aussi de promouvoir une adoption effective des outils numériques, et en particulier des outils d’IA. À l’heure où l’intelligence artificielle et la transformation numérique remodèlent la production et le fonctionnement des entreprises, l’adaptabilité de la main-d’œuvre devient un avantage concurrentiel décisif. Les pays qui œuvrent au développement de l’enseignement professionnel, à l’élargissement de l’accès à la formation tout au long de la vie et au resserrement des liens entre les universités et les marchés du travail seront mieux à même de s’adapter à l’évolution des besoins des entreprises.

La qualité des institutions et l’efficience des processus réglementaires sont tout aussi fondamentales. L’existence de cadres réglementaires prévisibles, transparents et bien conçus conforte la confiance et réduit l’incertitude. La solidité des institutions est un facteur d’amélioration de la répartition des ressources en même temps qu’un socle pour les incitations de marché. En période d’incertitude géopolitique et économique accrue, la stabilité macroéconomique et les cadres budgétaires, s’ils sont robustes, restent des points d’ancrage essentiels.

Ces conditions favorables ne sont toutefois pas suffisantes. Les marchés doivent également fonctionner efficacement pour promouvoir le dynamisme économique, la diffusion des technologies et l’investissement des entreprises. Lorsque ces dynamiques faiblissent, les politiques publiques visant à renforcer la concurrence et à réduire les obstacles réglementaires deviennent plus importantes. C’est pourquoi l’amélioration de la réglementation des marchés de produits et des régimes d’insolvabilité est une autre priorité cruciale en matière de réforme mise en évidence dans tous les pays. Des recommandations sont également ébauchées dans le domaine fiscal, sachant que des systèmes fiscaux mal conçus peuvent fausser les incitations et décourager l’investissement.

La mobilité et le taux d’activité de la main-d’œuvre restent également des facteurs déterminants pour la compétitivité et l’amélioration de l’accès des travailleurs à des emplois de qualité. Réduire les obstacles à la participation au marché du travail – en particulier des femmes, des travailleurs âgés et des groupes sous-représentés – tout en renforçant les incitations au travail, en améliorant l’employabilité et en élargissant l’accès à des services de garde d’enfants abordables, peut être un moyen de rehausser tant l’équité que l’efficience. Des politiques du logement qui facilitent la mobilité et des systèmes fiscaux qui élargissent la base d’imposition tout en limitant les distorsions peuvent encore accroître l’efficacité de la répartition des ressources.

S’ils peuvent s’appuyer sur des fondements solides et sur des incitations de marché efficaces, les pouvoirs publics sont en mesure de mieux orienter l’activité économique en fonction des priorités stratégiques. La politique d’innovation, la sécurité énergétique et la transition vers les énergies propres sont des domaines dans lesquels des actions ciblées et élaborées avec soin peuvent remédier aux défaillances du marché et soutenir la croissance à long terme. Les aides publiques à la recherche-développement peuvent, conjuguées à la présence d’un capital humain de qualité et de marchés concurrentiels, débloquer l’investissement privé. Des réformes du marché de l’énergie visant à abaisser les obstacles à l’entrée et à encourager l’investissement dans les énergies renouvelables peuvent permettre de progresser à la fois sur le plan de la résilience et de la compétitivité.

Un message essentiel délivré dans le présent rapport est que les réformes structurelles sont d’autant plus efficaces qu’elles sont cohérentes et complémentaires. Les réformes des marchés de produits ont pour effet d’amplifier l’impact des politiques destinée à augmenter le capital humain. La solidité des cadres budgétaires est un gage de renforcement de la confiance et une condition pour inscrire les réformes dans la durée. Les complémentarités entre les politiques sont particulièrement importantes dans un contexte de transformations technologiques et démographiques majeures.

Si les avantages à long terme qu’elles peuvent procurer sont dûment attestés, la faisabilité politique des réformes est souvent tributaire de leurs effets à court terme sur les politiques publiques. En présentant des exemples qui illustrent comment certaines réformes influent sur les résultats économiques à court terme, la présente publication nourrit la réflexion sur la conception et la mise en œuvre de trains de réformes qui soient efficaces sur le plan économique et suscitent en même temps un soutien large et sans réserve. Il peut être utile, pour entretenir la dynamique de réforme, de comprendre les effets transitoires, d’anticiper les effets redistributifs et de déployer des mesures complémentaires.

Les réformes structurelles jouent également un rôle décisif dans le renforcement de la viabilité des finances publiques. En période d’endettement public élevé et de montée des tensions sur les dépenses, les réformes propices à la croissance offrent une voie pour améliorer la dynamique de la dette sans s’appuyer exclusivement sur l’assainissement budgétaire. Si elles aboutissent à l’élargissement des bases d’imposition et à l’amélioration de l’efficience des administrations publiques et contribuent à stimuler le dynamisme économique, les réformes peuvent renforcer à la fois la résilience et la prospérité à long terme.

Enfin, la compétitivité n’est pas un jeu à somme nulle. Les économies qui consolident leurs fondations nationales participent au fonctionnement d’une économie mondiale plus dynamique et plus résiliente. L’objectif n’est pas simplement d’accélérer la croissance, mais d’assurer une croissance durable, tirée par l’innovation et compatible avec la durabilité environnementale et la cohésion sociale.

Les économies de l’OCDE voient s’ouvrir de nouvelles perspectives de croissance, mais surgir aussi des défis. Il sera primordial de tirer le meilleur parti de ces opportunités et de relever ces défis pour redynamiser la productivité et assurer un niveau de vie plus élevé aux générations futures.

Les fondements de la croissance doivent maintenant être rebâtis avec détermination et résolution.

Éditorial tiré de la publication de l’OCDE : Les fondements de la croissance et de la compétitivité

Références:

OCDE (2026), Les fondements de la croissance et de la compétitivité 2026, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/df51b240-fr.

OECD economies are facing new growth opportunities but also challenges. Taking the most out of these opportunities while addressing the challenges will be key to revitalise productivity and secure higher living standards for future generations.

by Stefano Scarpetta, OECD Chief Economist and G20/G7 Finance Deputy

Across the OECD and beyond, the foundations of economic growth are under strain. Over the past two decades, labour productivity growth has slowed markedly in most countries. This slowdown reflects a combination of structural bottlenecks: subdued business investment, declining firm dynamism, slowing technology diffusion and a weakening pace of human capital accumulation. While employment growth has been resilient, many countries are facing significant population ageing, which will affect the potential for labour to sustain growth.

At the same time, rapid advances in artificial intelligence and digital technologies offer the potential of a new wave of sustained productivity gains. Whether new technologies translate into sustained productivity gains will depend crucially on structural policy settings.

This first edition of Foundations for Growth and Competitiveness arrives at a pivotal moment. Structural reform momentum has slowed across many OECD countries but there is heightened need for countries to remain competitive and resilient in a global landscape characterised by unprecedented structural transformations and geopolitical and trade shocks. To help countries meet these challenges, the report offers practical tools for policy makers, including a comprehensive online data platform to identify structural policy bottlenecks and tailored reform priorities for 48 countries developed through an iterative dialogue with national authorities.

Sustainable prosperity rests on strong enabling conditions: high-quality human capital, sound institutions,
effective governance, reliable infrastructure, affordable and secure energy supply and macroeconomic stability. Across countries, strengthening skills systems and lifelong learning emerges as one of the most frequent reform priorities in this report also to promote an effective adoption of digital and in particular AI tools. As artificial intelligence and digitalisation reshape production and the way businesses work, workforce adaptability becomes a decisive competitive advantage. Countries that strengthen vocational education, expand access to lifelong learning and deepen links between universities and labour markets will be better placed to adapt to evolving business needs.

Institutional quality and efficient regulatory processes are equally critical. Predictable, transparent and well-designed regulatory frameworks foster trust and reduce uncertainty. Strong institutions improve the allocation of resources and underpin market incentives. In an era of heightened geopolitical and economic uncertainty, macroeconomic stability and sound fiscal frameworks remain essential anchors.

Yet enabling conditions alone are not sufficient. Markets must also function efficiently to promote economic
dynamism, technological diffusion and business investment. But when these forces are weakening, policies that strengthen competition and reduce regulatory barriers become more important. Accordingly, improving product market regulation and insolvency regimes is another central reform priority identified across countries. Recommendations also emerge in the tax space, given that poorly designed tax systems can distort incentives and discourage investment.

Labour mobility and participation also remain central to competitiveness and for enhancing access to quality jobs for workers. Reducing barriers to participation – particularly for women, older workers and underrepresented groups – while strengthening work incentives, employability and expanding access to affordable childcare can raise both equity and efficiency. Housing policies that facilitate mobility and tax systems that broaden the base while limiting distortions can further enhance allocative efficiency.

With strong foundations and effective market incentives in place, governments can more successfully guide economic activity toward strategic priorities. Innovation policy, energy security and the clean energy transition are areas where well-designed, targeted interventions can address market failures and support long-term growth. Public support for research and development, when combined with strong human capital and competitive markets, can unlock private investment. Energy market reforms that reduce entry barriers and encourage investment in renewables can strengthen both resilience and competitiveness.

A central message of this edition is that structural reforms are most powerful when they are coherent and complementary. Product market reforms enhance the impact of human capital-augmenting policies. Sound fiscal frameworks reinforce confidence and enable reform to endure. Policy complementarities are particularly important in the context of major technological and demographic transformations.

While the long-term benefits of reform are well documented, the political feasibility of reforms often hinges on near-term effects on policies. By providing examples of how some reforms affect economic performance in the short run, this edition provides food for thought in designing and implementing reform packages that are both economically effective and have strong and broad support. Understanding transitional effects, anticipating distributional impacts and deploying complementary measures can help sustain reform momentum.

Structural reforms also play a crucial role in strengthening fiscal sustainability. At a time of elevated public
debt and rising spending pressures, growth-enhancing reforms offer a path to improving debt dynamics without relying exclusively on fiscal consolidation. By broadening tax bases, improving government efficiency and boosting economic dynamism, reforms can reinforce both resilience and long-term prosperity.

Ultimately, competitiveness is not a zero-sum concept. Economies that strengthen their domestic foundations contribute to a more dynamic and resilient global economy. The objective is not simply faster growth, but growth that is durable, innovation-driven and aligned with environmental sustainability and social cohesion.

The OECD economies are facing new growth opportunities but also challenges. Taking the most out of these opportunities while addressing the challenges will be key to revitalise productivity and secure higher living standards for future generations.

The foundations of growth must now be rebuilt deliberately and decisively.

Editorial from the OECD Foundations for Growth and Competitiveness

References:

OECD (2026), Foundations for Growth and Competitiveness 2026, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/40a7532f-en.

Electricity and natural gas markets power modern economies. They fuel industrial production and transportation services, enable digital infrastructure, and meet households’ everyday energy needs. Because electricity and gas are inputs needed in almost every economic activity, how these markets perform matters beyond the energy sector itself.

By Cassie Castle, OECD Economics Department

Lire en français/French version

A large body of evidence shows that well-designed, competitive energy markets can discipline prices, strengthen investment incentives, and support innovation. Competition forces firms to improve efficiency, adopt new technologies and respond to consumer needs. When competition is weak, those pressures fade (OECD, 2022). The result is not only higher energy bills, but wider consequences for businesses, households and economic performance.

According to a new OECD working paper based on the OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) indicators, countries have already undertaken significant reforms to support competition. For much of the 20th century, electricity and natural gas sectors were mostly organised as vertically integrated state-owned monopolies, with limited incentives for efficiency or innovation. A major wave of liberalisation reforms, particularly during the 1990s, transformed this model. Many countries made significant steps to unbundle monopoly networks, regulate third-party access to infrastructure and open generation and retail markets to new entrants.

Despite this progress, important gaps remain. The new OECD working paper examines the current state of the regulatory framework in the electricity and natural gas markets across 50 countries. It evaluates the extent to which these frameworks support competition by lowering entry barriers, ensuring non-discriminatory access to monopoly network services and reducing switching costs across the supply chain. Drawing on the latest update of the OECD PMR indicators, the paper shows that while legal liberalisation is widespread, key regulatory shortcomings continue to limit the full benefits of competition (see Figure).

The PMR Sector Indicator for Energy: Latest results

Four issues stand out:

First, in some countries the monopoly network infrastructure — transmission and distribution grids — remains weakly separated from competitive activities like generation, storage and retail supply. In electricity, around 10% of surveyed countries impose only accounting separation or no separation at all. In natural gas, this rises to around 16% of countries. Where vertical integration persists, firms have both the incentive to favour their own affiliates and restrict rivals’ access to essential networks. Stronger forms of unbundling, such as legal or ownership separation, provide more robust safeguards and are widely recognised as best practice.

Second, a number of countries continue to restrict households and small businesses from choosing their retail energy supplier and maintain broad retail price regulation beyond targeted support for vulnerable households. This is usually the case when the market is not yet fully competitive. Where entry barriers persist, switching costs are high, or wholesale markets do not function effectively, premature liberalisation can lead to poor outcomes for consumers. However, concerns about price volatility may offer an additional explanation for why regulated retail tariffs remain in place, sometimes alongside market-based offers, particularly following the 2021-2023 energy crisis. Sharp price swings prompted some countries to extend or maintain retail price regulation for small consumers, even in otherwise well-developed markets. The paper explores this tension further. While price controls can provide stability in periods of stress, open-ended measures risk distorting price signals, weakening competitive pressures over time and reducing the benefits of open markets.

Third, even where consumers are free to choose, many lack the tools to engage effectively in retail markets. Retail competition can only deliver meaningful benefits if consumers have access to the information needed to make informed decisions when choosing their supplier. Most countries require suppliers to provide detailed consumption and cost data in monthly bills, but only a few also offer independent price comparison tools. The low rate of roll-out of smart meters also limits the information available to consumers to understand their patterns of consumptions and select the most suitable tariff. Without active support to help consumers make informed choices, the time and effort required to compare offers and change supplier acts as a barrier, even when cheaper offers exist. Lowering these switching costs is essential to making competition work in practice.

Fourth, in electricity markets, demand-side flexibility is increasingly important for grid stability and cost efficiency, helping manage peak demand and integrate variable renewables. However, explicit demand response is not universally available. Around 21% of the countries surveyed do not allow these programmes, and among those that do, roughly one-third restrict participation to industrial users, leaving smaller consumers, in particular households, largely excluded. Expanding household participation requires smart meter deployment to enable time-of-use and dynamic tariffs, alongside regulatory frameworks that permit dynamic pricing and aggregator participation. When these conditions are in place, households can shift consumption away from peak periods, reducing their energy bill, while limiting system costs and strengthening grid stability.

These findings point to an unfinished reform agenda. Legal liberalisation has advanced considerably, yet structural gaps still limit countries from enjoying the benefits of effective competition. Closing these gaps is becoming more urgent as energy systems shift toward higher shares of renewable and decentralised generation. Integrating variable supply requires greater flexibility through responsive demand and clear price signals. Competitive markets are key to delivering these adjustments efficiently. Completing the reform process is therefore not only about improving outcomes within the energy sector, but about supporting a more resilient energy system that underpins productivity and growth across the wider economy.

References

Castle, C. and C. Varriale (2026), “Building competitive energy markets: Regulatory insights from the OECD PMR indicators”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1863, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f47862f5-en.

OECD (2022), “Competition in Energy Markets”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 290, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/e2e1b9be-en.

For more information, please visit the OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) webpage: https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/product-market-regulation.html

Rising defence spending may lift economic activity modestly in the short term, but it brings additional fiscal strain while effects on long-run growth are uncertain. Lasting economic benefits are more likely if governments improve procurement and pursue broader structural reforms alongside rearmament.

By Ben Congrave and Young-Hyun Shin, OECD Economics Department

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Many countries have begun to raise defence spending significantly. The goal is to bolster security, not boost GDP. Still, it is important that governments consider the economic consequences of larger defence budgets and how to most effectively implement them. A new OECD working paper finds that increased military expenditure should add modestly to economic activity in the near term, but will also add to fiscal pressures and leave countries’ long-term growth challenges unresolved. Beyond the stabilising influence of improved security, lasting economic benefits from rearmament are far from guaranteed unless governments seize the moment to improve their procurement practices or pursue related structural reforms.

Relative to national income, defence spending is returning to levels last seen at the end of the Cold War in many OECD countries. Tilted towards weapons systems purchases, recent defence outlays aim to refill emptied stores of equipment and address gaps in capability exposed after years of underspending. In Europe, ammunition production has ramped up, while several countries are also restarting military service to build up reserve forces (among others, France and Germany) amid a degraded security environment.

Defence requirements will compete for resources with other national priorities, adding to fiscal pressure from greater outlays on pensions, health and long-term care, and climate measures. While governments have clearly explained the need for bigger defence budgets, less has been said on how to pay for them. Having borrowed to jump-start military build-ups after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, some countries have since raised taxes to prevent rapid debt accumulation. In this group are Estonia, Latvia and Poland, countries close to or already exceeding the 2035 target for core defence spending agreed among NATO allies in June 2025. Medium-term defence spending plans remain to be fully settled in other cases, including in higher-debt countries committed to allocating 3.5% of GDP to their militaries by 2035 (for instance, Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom). Fiscal rules will accommodate borrowing for defence expenditure in the next few years, notably in the European Union. Yet tough budget choices must be made if governments are to meet their defence commitments while keeping public debt at manageable levels.

The economic consequences of larger defence budgets are uncertain and will differ across countries. Fiscal multipliers from defence spending – a measure of the cumulated GDP gains over a given horizon relative to changes in government spending – frequently fall within a range of around 0.6 to 1 (Ramey, 2019; Ilzetzki, 2025). Such estimates suggest output gains should be expected in the near term, albeit with some crowding out of private activity. But effects will depend on the state of the economy, industrial structure, the public finances and macroeconomic policy reactions to the shock. Initially, activity generated by deficit-financed military purchases should help move economies with spare capacity, and relatively low public debt, closer to potential. Growth benefits may, however, shrink over time as strains on resources push up prices and interest rates, and as governments consolidate their budgets.

Among countries producing military equipment, the direct economic benefits of defence spending may be concentrated in a small part of the economy. However, trade should help distribute gains within and across national borders. Arms imports will weaken the overall demand stimulus from government spending, particularly in economies lacking a substantial local defence industry, but should also help limit the immediate costs of rearmament. By the same token, measures to bolster domestic military production could safeguard output gains from government defence purchases, but potentially at greater cost to the budget and in terms of productivity.

In the long run, for military expenditure to have lasting positive growth effects, it must expand the economy’s productive capacity. Economies will benefit over time if defence spending enhances national security. Some types of defence spending can also have enduring beneficial effects on productivity – for instance, when military research leads to innovation in civilian industries. On the flip side, benefits may be reduced if defence firms draw labour and capital away from more productive uses, particularly if this raises the cost of inputs needed for private research and development. Fiscal corrections, essential in many countries if defence budgets stay large, could neutralise any growth boost from defence spending, or cause net income losses over the long run.

Effective procurement will be essential if defence ministries are to encourage innovation and strengthen the defence industrial base while containing the costs of capability upgrades. Many advanced economies are undertaking reforms to improve the speed and coordination of acquisitions, including by streamlining complex procedures (Germany, Canada), increasing the use of off-the-shelf systems and government-to-government agreements (Poland and the Baltic states), and moving away from unduly rigid contracting practices. Greater cross-border coordination, particularly in Europe, backed with harmonised standards, could enhance efficiency, unlock economies of scale and expand markets for highly productive firms while safeguarding interoperability. Combined with broader structural reforms to enhance competition and reduce barriers to market entry, such measures would increase the likelihood that higher defence spending delivers lasting gains in growth and living standards.

References

Conigrave, B. and Y. Shin (2026), Fiscal and macroeconomic impacts of defence spending, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1861, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/b4860378-en.

Ilzetzki, E. (2025), Guns and growth: The Economic Consequences of Defense Buildups, Kiel Institue for the World Economy, Kiel, https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311212.

Ramey, V. (2019), Ten Years After the Financial Crisis: What Have We Learned from the Renaissance in Fiscal Research?, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 33/2, https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.33.2.89.

Austria enjoys high living standards, strong institutions and a highly skilled workforce. But the economy was hit hard by the energy price shocks following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. After a strong rebound from the pandemic, activity slowed sharply in 2023–24, leading to a prolonged recession and a sizeable fiscal deficit that stood at 4.5% of GDP in 2025.

By Falilou Fall, OECD Economics Department

While Austria has historically taken a relatively prudent approach to the public finances and ran a small surplus in the years before the pandemic, the government debt ratio is now about 80% of GDP and on a rising trajectory. A sustained adjustment is now needed to put the public finances on a more prudent path to meet Austria’s commitments under the revised EU governance framework.

Fiscal consolidation has begun and aims to bring the deficit below 3% of GDP by 2028 as part of 7-year steady fiscal adjustment to stabilise the debt ratio over the medium term. The measures adopted for 2025–26 mainly adjust existing programmes, but deeper reforms will be required in the coming years.

Ageing creates significant spending pressures (Figure 1). Austria’s population is ageing rapidly, with fewer prime-age workers and more retirees. This trend risks slowing growth and putting additional strain on pensions, health care and long-term care systems. With rising defence needs and the impact of climate change on the public finances, a large fiscal adjustment will be required in the coming years.

Encouraging higher labour market participation among women and older workers will be essential. Expanding affordable childcare, promoting shared parental leave and reducing tax disincentives for second earners would help boost female employment. Tightening access to early retirement and better targeting subsidised part-time retirement schemes would also help extend working lives.

Pension spending is already among the highest in the OECD and is projected to rise further. Linking the retirement age to life expectancy and adjusting pension indexation rules would strengthen the system’s long-term sustainability while protecting lower pensions.

Health and long-term care systems will face rising demand as the population ages. Strengthening primary care, improving coordination across the health system and promoting the use of generic medicines could enhance efficiency. In long-term care, improving working conditions, broadening the workforce and better targeting support will be key to maintaining service quality and financial sustainability.

Public spending in Austria is high compared with many European peers, reflecting its social protection system (Figure 2). Improving the efficiency of public expenditure—particularly in social protection and areas such as public employment, subsidies and procurement—could help create fiscal space to address the spending pressures, alongside efforts to better manage the cost of ageing.

Better targeting of social benefits could improve efficiency and fairness. Social assistance already plays an important redistributive role, but family benefits are largely universal. Gradually phasing out transfers for higher-income households would make the system more progressive.

At the same time, the retirement of large cohorts of civil servants provides an opportunity to reorganise and digitalise public administration. More systematic spending reviews and reforms to the fiscal equalisation framework would further strengthen incentives for efficiency.

Tax reform would support fiscal sustainability and growth. Austria’s tax system relies heavily on labour income while making relatively limited use of property and inheritance taxation. Shifting part of the tax burden away from labour—especially for low-income workers—towards more growth-friendly tax bases as VAT and property could improve both equity and efficiency.

Together, these reforms would help Austria restore fiscal space, strengthen economic resilience and ensure that high living standards can be maintained as the country navigates the challenges of ageing, energy transition and slower potential growth.

Visit the OECD’s Austria Economic Snapshot page for further information.

References:

OECD (2026), OECD Economic Surveys: Austria 2026, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/7cea027b-en.

Long-term sovereign bond yields have risen as fiscal pressures mount and central banks step back from bond markets. With private investors playing a larger role, borrowing costs may remain higher and markets may become more volatile, raising important questions for debt management and financial stability.

By Masatoshi Ando, Ben Conigrave, Álvaro Pina and Caroline Roulet, OECD Economics Department.

Long-term sovereign bond yields have risen in recent years and the spread between 30- and 10-year bond yields has widened (Figure 1, Panel A). This reflects investor concerns about the sustainability of public debt given persisting budget imbalances in many advanced economies and rising spending pressures from defence, ageing and climate change. At the same time, as discussed in the December 2025 OECD Economic Outlook, there have been marked changes in the mix of investors purchasing government bonds since the pandemic. These changes in the investor base likely contribute to the upward pressure on yields and may also be a source of future market volatility.

One key factor has been the shift from quantitative easing to quantitative tightening by the major central banks. The balance sheets of central banks expanded after the onset of the global financial crisis, and were boosted significantly further during the pandemic, primarily through sovereign debt purchases. More recently, with the shift to quantitative tightening in many jurisdictions, central banks have reduced their sovereign bond holdings either passively, by not reinvesting maturing securities, or by actively selling bonds. The share of total outstanding domestic sovereign debt held by the central bank is now largely back to pre-pandemic levels, including in the United States and the euro area (Figure 1, Panel B).

Figure 1. Long-term yields have risen and central bank bond holdings have shrunk

Note: Panel A shows weekly data, with the latest observation dated 20 February 2026. In panel B, ECB denotes the European Central Bank, US Fed the US Federal Reserve, BOC the Bank of Canada, and RBA the Reserve Bank of Australia. Domestic sovereign bonds held by central banks at the end of each year are expressed as a share of total domestic sovereign bonds outstanding. Data for 2025 data refer to Q3.
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics; Bank of Canada; European Central Bank; Federal Reserve; Reserve Bank of Australia; Statistics Canada; LSEG; and OECD calculations.

A counterpart to this is that the private sector has absorbed a rising share of new bond issuance, with the composition of investors becoming more dispersed and heterogenous (Figure 2). Over the year to 2025Q3 there were higher net purchases relative to GDP by banks and money market funds in all four economies displayed, and by other financial intermediaries such as investment funds and securities dealers in Australia, the euro area and the United States. In contrast, net purchases of sovereign bonds by traditional institutional investors, including pension funds and insurers, often declined relative to GDP.

The shift in the balance of sovereign bond purchases from central banks to price-sensitive private sector investors could affect the required rate of return on sovereign bonds (OECD, 2025; IMF, 2025). Yields might be more elevated to sustain demand for government debt in coming years, particularly in countries where fiscal trajectories may be viewed as unsustainable, pushing up the cost of government borrowing.

A related risk is that sovereign bond markets become more volatile. Some non-bank financial institutions have comparatively light regulatory frameworks, allowing them to operate with higher leverage. An example is hedge funds, which have been playing a growing role in the sovereign debt markets of many countries, including the US. High leverage could reduce their capacity to absorb new bond issuance at times of market stress due to a need for higher liquidity to meet potential investor redemptions and to offset changes in the value of their existing collateral (ECB, 2023; Sengupta and Jacobs, 2025). Higher bond market volatility may itself raise liquidity needs due to margin calls or redemptions from leveraged investment funds, potentially forcing asset sales including sovereign bonds.

Reforms affecting pension funds and associated financial intermediaries, coupled with a more uncertain environment, will also reduce the demand for very long-term bonds. For example, UK regulatory adjustments for liability-driven investment (LDI) funds introduced after the 2022 gilt market dislocation (LDI funds allow pension funds to match the interest sensitivity of their assets and liabilities through the use of derivatives) — including tighter leverage limits, higher liquidity buffers, and more conservative collateral management practices — reduced their capacity to maintain large, leveraged positions in long-dated gilts (BIS, 2025). In Japan, higher yields and elevated policy uncertainty have made life insurers moderate their demand for very long‑term sovereign bonds, at least temporarily (Reuters, 2025). The shift from defined benefit to defined contribution schemes in countries such as the Netherlands and the United Kingdom has also reduced the emphasis on duration matching of fixed liabilities for pension funds, diminishing their demand for long-term sovereign bonds (PIMCO, 2023).

For a given maturity distribution of debt issuance, such reforms potentially raise yields and volatility at the long end of the yield curve, though the increasing demand for safer assets such as government bonds from funded pension systems as the population ages will have the opposite impact. Some debt management offices have also shifted issuance toward shorter maturities to mitigate rising interest expenditures, although this may heighten refinancing risks and governments’ sensitivity to fluctuations in short‑term interest rates.

Figure 2. Net purchases of sovereign bonds by investor type in selected advanced economies

Quarterly averages

Note: The figure shows net purchases of general government debt securities of all maturities, consolidated to eliminate intra-government transactions. Quarterly averages are presented for three periods: the latest quantitative easing (QE) episode, the subsequent period of quantitative tightening (QT), and the most recent four quarters with available data for all four jurisdictions (which often overlaps the QT period). QE and QT periods follow central bank announced implementation dates. When both QE and QT take place in the same quarter, none is retained unless one clearly outweighs the other. “Other financial intermediaries” include non-money market investment funds (among which hedge funds), securities dealers and non-bank money lenders. “Institutional investors” refers to insurance companies and pension funds. “Real sectors” encompass households, non-profit organisations, and non-financial corporations. Data are seasonally adjusted and expressed as a share of contemporaneous quarterly GDP. For the United States, net purchases by households are likely overstated, and those by foreign hedge funds (included in the rest of the world) concomitantly understated, since 2023 (Barth et al., 2025).
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics; European Central Bank; Federal Reserve; Statistics Canada; OECD National Accounts Databases; and OECD calculations.

References

BIS (2025), BIS Quarterly Review, September, Bank for International Settlements.

Barth, D., Beltran, D., Hoops, M., Kahn, J., Liu, E., and M. Perozek (2025), The Cross-Border Trail of the Treasury Basis Trade, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, FEDS Notes, October.

ECB (2023), Financial Stability Review, November 2023.

IMF (2025), “Shifting ground beneath the calm: Stability challenges amid changes in financial markets”, Global Financial Stability Report, October, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.

OECD (2025), Global Debt Report 2025: Financing Growth in a Challenging Debt Market Environment, OECD Publishing, Paris.

Pimco (2023), The End of the Dutch Defined Benefit Model A Steeper Euro Swap Curve Ahead, July.

Reuters (2025), Japan’s major life insurers plan to trim yen bond holdings in Oct-March, October.

Sengupta, R. and J. Jacobs (2025), The Changing Investor Composition of U.S. Treasuries, Part 2: Who’s Buying U.S. Treasuries?, Economic Bulletin, Federal Reserve of Kansas City, July.

La población joven del Perú tiene un gran potencial, pero una parte importante sigue sin aprovecharse. La movilidad intergeneracional ha mejorado en educación, pero sigue siendo débil en ingresos. Esta desconexión explica por qué una población joven y cada vez más educada no se ha traducido en un mayor crecimiento de la productividad ni en oportunidades económicas más amplias.

Por Paula Garda, Departamento de Economía de la OCDE
Leer la versión en inglés

A pesar del aumento del nivel educativo entre generaciones, los débiles resultados de aprendizaje y transiciones escuela-trabajo, la elevada informalidad y las persistentes brechas de género limitan la movilidad ascendente e impiden que el capital humano se utilice plenamente. Abordar estas limitaciones permitiría aumentar la productividad, ampliar el empleo formal y elevar el potencial de crecimiento de largo plazo del Perú.

El acceso a la educación ha mejorado, pero sus resultados siguen siendo débiles

El nivel de educación alcanzado ha mejorado sustancialmente entre generaciones. La movilidad educativa intergeneracional, que mide si los hijos alcanzan niveles educativos superiores a los de sus padres, aumentó un 56% entre las cohortes nacidas en las décadas de 1940 y 1980 (Figura 1). Este avance es mayor que en la mayoría de los países pares de América Latina y refleja una expansión sostenida del acceso a la educación durante décadas.

Sin embargo, el progreso ha sido desigual. Solo el 59% de los jóvenes de 15 a 19 años está matriculado en el sistema educativo, lo que refleja elevadas tasas de abandono escolar, especialmente en las zonas rurales, donde largos desplazamientos, presiones económicas y una entrada temprana al mercado laboral alejan a muchos estudiantes de la escuela.

Los avances educativos no se han traducido en una movilidad de ingresos similar. La movilidad intergeneracional de ingresos, que mide si los hijos ganan más que sus padres en la adultez, aumentó solo un 15%, muy por debajo de la movilidad educativa. Esto muestra que una mayor educación no ha generado aumentos proporcionales de ingresos entre generaciones. El lugar donde crece un niño y si sus padres trabajan en la informalidad siguen influyendo fuertemente en sus perspectivas de ingresos en la adultez. Los residentes rurales, las mujeres y los hijos de trabajadores informales tienen una probabilidad significativamente menor de superar los ingresos de sus padres, lo que limita tanto la equidad como el crecimiento de largo plazo.

Cuando la escuela no conduce a mejores ingresos

Los resultados de aprendizaje siguen siendo débiles pese al mayor acceso a educación. Las puntuaciones del Perú en PISA están muy por debajo del promedio de la OCDE, situando al país cerca de la parte inferior entre las economías participantes. Los estudiantes de hogares más pobres obtienen resultados considerablemente peores que sus pares, lo que refleja brechas en la calidad docente, la infraestructura y el acceso a servicios básicos, especialmente en las escuelas rurales.

Los bajos niveles de aprendizaje contribuyen a transiciones difíciles de la escuela al trabajo. Alrededor de uno de cada cinco jóvenes peruanos no estudia ni trabaja ni recibe formación. Las tasas de jóvenes que no estudian ni trabajan son más altas entre las mujeres, debido en parte a la maternidad temprana y al acceso limitado a servicios de cuidado infantil, lo que restringe la inserción laboral al inicio de la vida activa.

Incluso quienes trabajan suelen quedar atrapados en empleos informales. Más del 71% del total de los trabajadores y más del 85% de los jóvenes ocupados son informales (Figura 2). Los empleos informales ofrecen poca capacitación, bajos salarios y ausencia de protección social, lo que reduce los incentivos para acumular habilidades. Como resultado, la informalidad se transmite con frecuencia entre generaciones, atrapando a las familias en empleos de baja productividad y debilitando el crecimiento de la productividad.

Las brechas de género refuerzan estas dinámicas. Las mujeres han cerrado en gran medida las brechas educativas con respecto a los hombres, pero aún enfrentan una brecha de empleo de 17 puntos porcentuales y ganan en promedio un 19% menos. Las responsabilidades desiguales de cuidado y la limitada disponibilidad de servicios de cuidado infantil y de personas mayores empujan a muchas mujeres hacia empleos informales o a tiempo parcial, reduciendo los ingresos a lo largo de la vida y la oferta laboral.

Prioridades de política para impulsar la movilidad intergeneracional

Desbloquear todo el potencial del Perú requiere actuar en varios frentes:

• Mejorar la calidad de la educación y las bases tempranas. Ampliar el acceso a la educación inicial para niños menores de tres años, especialmente en zonas rurales y vulnerables, mejoraría los resultados cognitivos y favorecería una mayor participación laboral femenina. Fortalecer la formación docente, aplicar criterios meritocráticos en la contratación y mejorar la infraestructura escolar rural es esencial para cerrar brechas de aprendizaje y reducir el abandono escolar.
• Fortalecer la transición de la escuela al empleo formal. La educación y formación técnica y profesional sigue siendo limitada. Solo el 2% de los jóvenes está matriculado en programas de educación profesional y técnica (EFTP), muy por debajo de los países de la OCDE. Ampliar la EFTP, mejorar su gobernanza y alinear los programas con las necesidades del mercado laboral facilitaría el acceso al empleo formal. La educación de segunda oportunidad, combinada con servicios de empleo y apoyo social focalizado, puede ayudar a reincorporar a los jóvenes que no estudian ni trabajan.
• Crear empleo formal. Mejorar las competencias ayudaría a reducir la informalidad, pero se necesita una agenda integral que combine reformas educativas, del mercado laboral y del entorno empresarial para que la formalidad sea la norma y no la excepción. Trasladar las contribuciones a la seguridad social desde un esquema basado en el tamaño de la empresa hacia un esquema progresivos basados en los ingresos laborales, más bajos para trabajadores de más bajos salarios, reduciría los incentivos para que las empresas permanezcan pequeñas o informales. Simplificar regulaciones laborales y empresariales, fortalecer la fiscalización y mejorar la productividad de las pymes y su acceso al financiamiento favorecería la creación de empleos de mayor calidad.

Mejorar la movilidad intergeneracional impulsaría el crecimiento económico. Cuando los niños pueden desarrollar plenamente su potencial independientemente de su origen familiar, el país se beneficiaría de una fuerza laboral más numerosa y mejor calificada. Al mejorar la calidad de la educación, ampliar el empleo formal y reducir las brechas de género, el Perú puede convertir a su población joven en el motor de un crecimiento más fuerte y ampliamente compartido.

Para más información: Panorama económico de la OCDE para el Perú.

Referencia
OCDE (2025), OECD Economic Surveys: Peru 2025, OECD Publishing, París.

Artificial intelligence is fast becoming a defining driver of electricity demand in Europe. As AI deployment accelerates, the key constraint is shifting from computing power to the capacity of electricity grids to absorb large, continuous and localised loads. This blog examines how updating and modernising grid planning, connection rules and energy regulation are emerging as important enablers of AI’s future in the EU.

By Ruben Maximiano and Wouter Meester, OECD Economics Department.

AI’s energy reality

Dieser Blog ist auch auf Deutsch verfügbar: Strom – die treibende Kraft der KI-Revolution

AI is often discussed as though it operates independently of physical systems. In practice, AI depends on vast amounts of electricity. Its future will be determined not only by advances in algorithms and computing power, but also by kilowatt-hours – by the ability of electricity systems to deliver power reliably and at scale.

Training and running frontier models requires continuous and increasingly large volumes of power. According to the IEA, a typical AI-focused data centre already consumes as much electricity as 100 000 households, whilst the largest new facilities could require 20 times more, placing them on par with the consumption of small countries (IEA, 2025).

As a result, an important binding constraint on AI deployment is no longer generation alone. It is increasingly the capacity of electricity systems to absorb, transport and manage large, continuous and geographically concentrated loads without conflicting with other usages. As the recent OECD Diagnostic Tool for Reducing Regulatory Barriers to Solar, Wind and Pumped Hydro Storage in the EU report shows, tackling these also involve better regulations.

The importance of energy to AI roll-out is visible in corporate energy sourcing strategies. Big Tech companies now account for the majority of Corporate Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) in Europe (see figure 1). Yet the scale and speed of AI deployment are already outpacing what traditional PPAs can guarantee. Hyperscalers are turning to direct investment in generation, including solar, wind and nuclear, to secure long-term supply.

Taken together, these developments point to the conclusion that the next frontier of AI policy is not only about how much electricity is produced, but also about how grids are planned, reinforced and that to a significant extent depends on how grid investment and grid connection rules are regulated.

To address such barriers systematically in the EU, the OECD report Diagnostic Tool for Reducing Regulatory Barriers to Solar, Wind and Pumped Hydro Storage in the EU, identifies the regulatory bottlenecks that slow deployment of renewables in the EU and constrain grid availability, with clear parallels for policymakers seeking to adapt energy rules to enable AI deployment. As this blog is based on this work it refers mainly to EU practices and energy mix.

Global AI and local grids

While global electricity demand from AI remains moderate (expected to reach 3% globally by 2030 and 4.5% in the EU)(IEA 2025, Ember 2025), its impact is highly concentrated. Data centres cluster in locations offering robust fibre connectivity, favourable cooling conditions, low electricity prices, and fast, reliable grid access. This concentration amplifies pressure on local grids and exposes the limits of existing planning and connection frameworks.

Ireland illustrates these risks. In 2023, data centres accounted for around 21% of electricity consumption in 2023 up from 5% in 2015. Much of this has been concentrated around Dublin, where data centres consume roughly half of electricity produced. The resulting strain on the network raised security-of-supply concerns and led to the Transmission System Operator stop accepting applications for new data centres in Dublin until 2028 (Ember, 2025, CRU, 2025). In response, the national regulator is introducing a number of regulatory changes, including requirements for new data centres to install dispatchable generation or storage facilities on site.

The countries with more abundant and affordable electricity and stronger grids have a comparative advantage for the location of data centres. For instance, the Nordic countries have become attractive AI destinations due to abundant energy, strong grids and low-carbon baseload (Ember 2025). More broadly, IEA analysis suggest that jurisdictions offering significantly faster grid-connection timelines could capture up to 20% more data-centre growth by 2030 (IEA, 2025).

How AI stresses electricity systems

These pressures materialise across three interconnected timescales. In the long term, large AI campuses require transmission and distribution networks with sufficient hosting capacity, yet grid expansion and permitting often take 5 to 10 years. This makes anticipatory planning and co-ordination between data-centre siting, grid investment and local generation essential. Just as important is grid optimisation: improving system efficiency through digitalisation and AI-based system management.

In the medium term, inefficient connection rules have become a binding constraint. Long queues, speculative applications and first-come, first-served rules delay viable projects and distort planning. In real time, AI workloads introduce rapid power swings – far faster than traditional industrial loads -challenging frequency stability and voltage control.

Addressing these pressures requires regulatory frameworks that enable not only physical grid reinforcement, but also optimisation through digitalisation, flexibility procurement and stability services, and that allow system operators to invest in software and operational solutions alongside traditional capital assets.

The Diagnostic Tool shows that key elements of the regulatory system that contribute to address these pressures, would include:

• Anticipatory grid investment supported by clear cost-recovery rules.
• Criteria-based connection queues to prioritise ready and system-beneficial projects.
• Hosting-capacity maps to guide efficient siting.
• Flexible access arrangements, including non-firm and hybrid connections.
• Tariff and market design that value flexibility and stability services.

How countries are responding

Countries are increasingly adapting electricity regulation to manage the highly localised grid impacts of AI-driven demand. Governments are experimenting across different parts of the power system. In Europe, Italy is improving locational planning through detailed hosting-capacity maps; Portugal is reallocating unused capacity and simplifying storage licensing; the UK is reforming connection queues by prioritising projects that are “first ready, first connected”; the Netherlands is deploying congestion-management zones and prioritisation criteria; and Finland is integrating data centres into heat-recovery and clean-power strategies.

Despite this diversity, common policy lessons seem to emerge. Grid access can no longer be treated as a simple administrative queue and requires prioritisation based on readiness. Locational transparency is critical to guide efficient investment. Flexibility and digital optimisation must complement traditional grid reinforcement. Finally, grid planning and permitting need to become anticipatory rather than reactive. Countries applying these principles are better positioned to accommodate AI-scale demand while preserving reliability and affordability.

Powering the age of intelligence

AI is reshaping electricity demand at a scale that is now central to economic strategy. Ensuring reliable, affordable and low-carbon supply is becoming a prerequisite for attracting and sustaining digital investment. In the age of AI, competitiveness, autonomy and resilience will increasingly be determined not only by data and algorithms, but by the rules that govern the compute infrastructure and their electricity systems.

The OECD–EU Diagnostic Tool offers governments a practical roadmap to modernise regulatory frameworks and align them with the needs of an electricity-intensive digital economy.

*We will be launching the Diagnostic Tool today, 29^th January. You may register here.

References

CRU, “Large Energy Users connection policy”, December 2025, https://cruie-live-96ca64acab2247eca8a850a7e54b-5b34f62.divio-media.com/documents/CRU2025236_Large_Energy_User_connection_policy_decision_paper.pdf

Ember, 2025, Grids for data centres: ambitious grid planning can win Europe’s AI race, https://ember-energy.org/app/uploads/2025/06/Grids-for-data-centres-in-Europe.pdf

IEA, 2025, Energy and AI, World Energy Outlook Special Report

OECD, 2025, OECD–EU Diagnostic Tool for Reducing Regulatory Barriers to Solar, Wind and Pumped Hydro Storage

By Cristiana Vitale, OECD Economics Department.

Effective competition is central to vibrant economies. It keeps prices low for consumers, encourages firms to improve their products, foster an efficient use of resources, and helps innovative new firms enter markets. But market competition depends on well-designed regulation and critically, on the way policymakers interact with the stakeholders affected by those rules. A new OECD working paper highlights how stakeholder consultation is a key part of an effective regulatory framework, but inadequate transparency and accountability in interactions with interest groups risk tilting the playing field in favour of well-resourced incumbent firms.

A growing body of research shows that well-connected firms often use political influence to shape rules in ways that protect their market position by pushing for complex regulatory requirements that are disproportionately costly for smaller or newer competitors, or to obtain preferential access to contracts and loans. Political connections can help less productive firms survive while preventing more innovative ones from scaling up. The consequences are clear: markets become less contestable, innovation slows, and productivity growth suffers.

The latest update of the OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) indicators, which track laws and regulations across 47 countries, shows that most governments require stakeholders to be consulted when new laws and regulations are drafted. This could improve policy design as stakeholder engagement helps policymakers to better understand the real-world effects of regulatory intervention. But the same data also reveal major gaps in how countries manage lobbying activities and ensure integrity standards, leaving policymaking vulnerable to undue influence (see Figure 1 below).

It is notable that more than one-half of the surveyed countries lack basic integrity safeguards for public officials involved in regulatory processes. One-third lack comprehensive conflict-of-interest rules, and over one-third do not require any cooling-off period if senior officials leave office for the private sector. Strikingly, the two countries in the survey that have none of these two integrity standards are OECD members.

Transparency in lobbying interactions is even more limited. Only two countries—Chile and Poland—meet all four key disclosure requirements assessed in the PMR data, including maintaining a public lobbyist registry and requiring policymakers to disclose both their meeting agendas and the identities of the interest groups they meet. Twelve countries have none of these obligations.

Even when lobbying registries exist, they often cover only some types of interest groups or are voluntary. Public officials’ disclosure obligations are also rare: just 28% of countries require officials to reveal which interest groups they meet, and only 23% require meeting agendas to be published online.

As governments increasingly use industrial policies to promote innovation, encourage decarbonisation, and support strategic sectors, strong safeguards against undue influence are becoming more important. Lobbying is not inherently negative; policymakers benefit from engaging with stakeholders who understand the real-world effects of regulations. However, unregulated lobbying can redirect subsidies and support toward well-connected incumbents rather than potential innovators. This undermines the effectiveness of public spending and entrenches market power instead of encouraging technological dynamism and reducing barriers to the entry and growth of new companies.

With evidence of rising market concentration across advanced economies, the risk that lobbying will impede competition is likely to grow. The new PMR data reveal a clear message: while most countries value stakeholder engagement, many do too little to ensure transparency and integrity in lobbying practices. Strengthening rules on conflicts of interest, expanding disclosures by both lobbyists and public officials, and ensuring open registers of interest groups would help restore trust and support competitive markets.

References

Vitale, C. and R. Bitetti (2026), “Regulating lobbying activities to protect competition: New evidence from the OECD PMR indicators”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1855, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ad88f58a-en.

Akcigit, U., S. Baslandze and F. Lotti (2023), “Connecting to Power: Political Connections, Innovation, and Firm Dynamics”, Econometrica, Vol. 91/2, pp. 529-564, https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta18338.

Alexander, R., S. Mazza and S. Scholz (2009), “Measuring Rates of Return for Lobbying Expenditures: An Empirical Case Study of Tax Breaks for Multinational Corporations”, SSRN Electronic Journal, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1375082.

Faccio, M. (2006), “Politically Connected Firms”, American Economic Review, Vol. 96/1, pp. 369-386, https://doi.org/10.1257/000282806776157704.

Koltay, G., S. Lorincz and T. Valletti (2023), “Concentration and Competition: Evidence From Europe and Implications For Policy”, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Vol. 19/3, pp. 466-501, https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhad012.