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Business support must now facilitate the recovery from COVID-19

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by Martin Borowiecki and Jon Pareliussen, OECD Economics Department

These are extraordinary times. Governments have shown through their unprecedented policy actions that they will do whatever it takes to support companies and workers through the COVID-19-induced lockdowns. The OECD COVID-19 Policy Tracker (OECD, 2020a) reports that massive credit supply, cash grants and tax deferrals provided unprecedented liquidity support for businesses. These policies have helped firms weather the sharp drop in demand resulting from the pandemic, and short-time work schemes allowed firms to maintain existing employment relationships to enable them to return fast to full production (OECD, 2020b). Without the extensive policy responses governments have swiftly put in place, nearly one in three companies would have faced liquidity shortfalls during lockdowns, and many otherwise viable firms would now be bankrupt (OECD, 2020c). But these measures came at the price of higher public and corporate indebtedness, may have kept unviable firms artificially alive, and may have increased the scope for lobbying and capture by sectoral interests.

As many countries are entering a new phase of re-opening, economic revival and rebuilding, under continued caution over health risks, governments will need to adjust life support to businesses. Loans and guarantees should be scaled back in favour of policies that help kick-start the economy and at the same time tackle long-term challenges such as climate change and digitalization. As some sectors will see persistently low demand, it is crucial that policies facilitate structural change. Several countries have already started to lay the ground for the recovery.

Policy support kept companies alive during the initial COVID-19 crisis

The COVID-19 shock has led governments and central banks to implement unprecedented measures to keep existing companies alive. They deployed extraordinary lending support in the form of loans and loan guarantees for struggling businesses in response to strict containment measures put in place to contain the impact of the pandemic (OECD, 2020d). For example, Germany has announced EUR 756 billion (22% of GDP) in public sector loans and guarantees in addition to unlimited credit supply by the national development bank KfW, followed by Italy (17% of GDP) and the United Kingdom (15%). The headline figures are upper limits, while the effective uptake of funds is often much lower (Figure 1). Nevertheless, targeted lending support came at massive fiscal costs and brings with it the risk of lobbying by big firms and capture by political powerful sectors. This bias remains even in countries coupling state support with a ban on dividend payments and share-buybacks, and excluding firms domiciled in tax havens.

Tax deferrals and cash support to foot companies’ wage bills and avoid permanent lay-offs provided additional liquidity at a time when many businesses saw a sharp drop in revenues due to the pandemic (Figure 2). They prevented the break-up of existing relationships between firms and their employees, ultimately laying the ground for a quicker recovery. However, their design often risks opportunistic behaviour by firms and unnecessarily restricts activity in sectors that remained open.

Policy now needs to focus on supporting demand for a sustained recovery

Moving forward, a new set of policies needs to replace life support to businesses. Policy should continue to support demand until the recovery has taken hold. Loans and guarantees should be scaled back in favour of fiscal policies that help kick-start the economy and structural policies that tackle long-term challenges such as climate change and digitalization. As some sectors will see persistently low demand, it is crucial that policies facilitate structural change.

A number of countries have already announced fiscal packages that give priority to private investment and public spending with presumably high multipliers. These packages could inform those currently in preparation in other countries.

References:

Banque de France (2020), “Do highly indebted large corporations pose a systemic risk?” EcoNotepad Post no. 147, Banque de France, Paris.

Barnes, S., R. Hillman, D. MacDonald, and G. Wharf, “The impact of COVID-19 on corporate fragility: insights from a new calibrated firm-level corporate sector agent-based model” (forthcoming), OECD, Paris.

Brookings (2020), “What’s the Fed doing in response to the COVID-19 crisis? What more could it do?” Brookings Report, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C, https://www.brookings.edu/research/fed-response-to-covid19.

Bruegel (2020), “Government-guaranteed bank lending: beyond the headline numbers”, Bruegel Blog Post, Bruegel, Brussels, https://www.bruegel.org/2020/07/government-guaranteed-bank-lending-beyond-the-headline-numbers.

OECD (2020a), Country Policy Tracker (database), available at https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/country-policy-tracker/ (Accessed 23 May 2020), Paris.

OECD (2020b), “Lockdown policies and people in the age of COVID-19: Lessons from the OECD Policy Tracker”, OECD COVID-HUB Policy Blog Post, OECD, Paris.

OECD (2020c), “Corporate sector vulnerabilities during the Covid-19 outbreak: assessment and policy responses”, OECD COVID-HUB Policy Brief, OECD Publishing, Paris,

OECD (2020d), OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2020 Issue 1: Preliminary version, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0d1d1e2e-en.

OECD (2020e), “The potential long-term impact of the COVID-induced development of teleworking on productivity” (forthcoming), OECD COVID-HUB Policy Brief, OECD, Paris.

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