By David Crowe, Jörg Haas, Valentine Millot, Łukasz Rawdanowicz and Sébastien Turban, OECD Economics Department

Debates about sovereign debt sustainability have revived in light of the massive increases in debt since the 2008 economic crisis and more recently during the COVID-19 pandemic. In this context, some argue that debt sustainability risks are significantly reduced as long as the interest rate is lower than the rate of GDP growth. We offer a word of caution in our recent paper: Constraints and demands on public finances: Considerations of resilient fiscal policy (Rawdanowicz et al., 2021).

While it is true that such a negative interest rate-growth differential (the so-called r-g) helps to stabilise debt in the very long term, debt dynamics in the near term depend also on the primary budget balance, and a continued increase in debt cannot be excluded with large primary budget deficits. Conversely, debt could fall substantially with moderate primary deficits. We should also note that maintaining high debt raises countries’ vulnerability to interest rate surges and growth declines, and increases debt rollover risks. This is all the more important given the uncertainty about, and the volatility of, r-g (Orszag, Rubin and Stiglitz, 2021; Mauro and Zhou, 2020).

Negative r-g does not eliminate risks to debt sustainability and fiscal authorities should pay attention to primary budget balances, which reflect the political choices in terms of revenues and spending, thus contributing to shape the strength of the economy through various channels.

Government interest payments declined despite rising gross debt

The fiscal response to the COVID-19 crisis prevented larger declines in employment, income and output, and is paving the way for a sustainable recovery. At the same time, government debt relative to GDP has reached the highest levels in several decades, adding to a pre-crisis upward trend in sovereign debt (Figure 1, Panel A).

Figure 1. Government interest payments and r-g declined despite rising gross debt

Despite rising debt, government interest payments have declined since the 1980s, reaching just above 1% of GDP in the median OECD economy (Figure 1, Panel A). This was possible due to falling nominal and real yields on longer‑term government bonds that started in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The falling interest rates helped lower the trend in the effective r-g, mitigating the impact of the increase in gross debt on public finances (Figure 1, Panel B).

Negative r-g always stabilises debt, but potentially at high levels

Persistently negative r‑g helps lower debt. Together with moderate levels of primary budget deficits, debt reductions can be substantial in these circumstances, especially at high initial debt levels as shown in stylised and illustrative simulations (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Negative r-g can reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio significantly when primary deficits are modest

Actually, debt will stabilise with any constant primary budget deficit when r-g is negative. However, depending on the level of the primary budget balance and r-g, this stabilisation may only occur after a prolonged and large increase in debt. To demonstrate this point, in our working paper we presented stylised and purely illustrative simulations for different values of initial debt, the primary budget balance, and the level of r-g. Both the size of the negative r-g and the primary budget balance are fundamental for determining the speed and the level at which the debt to GDP ratio stabilises, while initial debt is less important.

High debt carries risks for public finances

As debt can stabilise at a high level and only in a distant future despite a negative r-g, two additional issues are important in assessing debt sustainability.

First, increasing and elevated debt can lead to higher interest rates and make public finances vulnerable to changes in economic conditions in general, and interest rates in particular. For instance, declines in GDP can bring about big increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio through the same mechanism through which negative r-g can help stabilise debt levels, exacerbated by cyclical deteriorations in the primary budget balance. Such debt increases may be difficult to reverse if growth is low and budget deficits remain large several years after a recession. Moreover, the longer-term evolution of government bond yields is highly uncertain (Orszag, Rubin and Stiglitz, 2021) and current low effective interest rates in relation to GDP growth do not exclude a possibility of future high sovereign yields (Mauro and Zhou, 2020). In general, high debt may limit the fiscal space to accommodate negative shocks and thus result in sub-optimal fiscal responses to future recessions (Jordà, Schularick and Taylor, 2016).

Second, at current debt levels, OECD countries will have to issue significant amounts of bonds in coming years. Some of the rollover risks could be mitigated by managing debt maturity to avoid concentration of large debt rollovers. Central banks’ purchases of government bonds could also help mitigate rollover risks, but maintaining positive confidence may require very large (gross) purchases.

References

Jordà, Ò., M. Schularick and A. Taylor (2016), “Sovereigns versus banks: Credit, crises, and consequences”, Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 14/1, pp. 45-79, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12144.

Mauro, P. and J. Zhou (2020), “r minus g negative: Can We Sleep More Soundly?”, IMF Working Papers, Vol. 20/52, http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781513536071.001.

Orszag, P., R. Rubin and J. Stiglitz (2021), “Fiscal resiliency in a deeply uncertain world: The role of semiautonomous discretion”, PIIE Policy Brief, No. 21-2, Peterson Insitute for International Economics, https://www.piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/fiscal-resiliency-deeply-uncertain-world-role-semiautonomous-discretion.

Rawdanowicz, Ł. et al. (2021), “Constraints and demands on public finances: Considerations of resilient fiscal policy”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1694, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/602500be-en.

By David Crowe, Valentine Millot and Łukasz Rawdanowicz, OECD Economics Department

Due to the COVID-19 crisis, sovereign debt in relation to GDP has increased massively, reaching the highest levels in several decades in many countries. Current low interest rates reduce concerns about debt sustainability, but high debt makes public finances vulnerable to negative shocks. Thus, governments will have to balance the need to minimise the risk of fiscal stress and the need to satisfy growing demands on public finances.

In this context, in our recent paper Constraints and demands on public finances: Considerations of resilient fiscal policy (Rawdanowicz et al., 2021), we analyse 17 episodes of large and prolonged sovereign debt reductions in OECD countries since the 1970s. We find that such debt reductions were achieved primarily by increasing budget surpluses, supported by a context of strong nominal GDP growth (on average 7%). Debt reduction episodes were initiated in response to rising debt and interest payments, sometimes resulting from economic crises. It is noteworthy that in some cases debt reduction episodes were accompanied by revamping fiscal frameworks.

There are many examples of large and prolonged debt reductions

We identify 17 episodes that involved persistent reductions in gross debt (spanning at least five years, but allowing for temporary debt reversals) of at least 15% of GDP, in contrast to a traditional focus in the literature on fiscal consolidations which are measured by changes in budget balances – e.g. (Molnár, 2012) (Figure 1). Most of the episodes started in the 1990s and ended before the global financial crisis. On average across the episodes, debt was reduced by just over 30% of GDP over 11 years, but the size and duration varied across the episodes (Figure 1, Panel A). In many episodes, initial debt was no higher than 80% of GDP and, in most cases, the debt‑to‑GDP ratio was reduced by less than half (Figure 1, Panel B).

Figure 1. Episodes of large and prolonged sovereign debt reductions: main statistics

High budget surpluses and strong GDP growth were instrumental in lowering debt

Most of the debt reductions took place in an environment of high nominal GDP growth (on average 7% across countries and years; Figure 1, Panel C), in particular in Hungary and the United Kingdom. The notable exceptions are Germany and Switzerland (2004-2018), where nominal growth was modest but still r-g was negative and the budget surpluses were high. In line with this, in most cases, the primary budget balance‑to‑GDP ratio improved as primary revenue increased by more or declined by less than primary spending (Figure 2, Panel A). In addition, average growth in nominal primary expenditure was not higher than average nominal GDP growth (Figure 2, Panel B). In some countries (e.g. Finland and Canada), the debt reduction episode also coincided with a substantial depreciation of the domestic currency, helping export growth (Figure 2, Panel C).

Decomposing the annual average changes in debt (see details in Annex B of Rawdanowicz et al. 2021) shows that in most of the episodes a high primary budget surplus reduced debt – on average by 2% of GDP per annum, but in some cases by more than 3% of GDP (Figure 1, Panel A). In two thirds of the episodes, higher growth than interest rates lowered the debt-to-GDP ratio (Figure 1, Panel C), with a total contribution of the snowball effect to the debt reduction (i.e. a combined effect of the interest rate growth differential and the lagged level of gross debt) on average close to 1% of GDP per year. A few countries benefited also from favourable stock flow adjustments (i.e. all changes in the debt ratio that are not explained by the budget balance and the snowball effect, like sale or purchase of financial assets). This was particularly the case in Iceland and the Slovak Republic due to very large interest earnings and a sizeable reduction in the ratio of government financial assets to GDP, respectively.

Figure 2. Episodes of large and prolonged sovereign debt reductions: additional statistics  

While the economic and political context triggering debt reductions varied across countries, there were a few common themes

Growing fiscal pressures. In several episodes, debt reductions were initiated following prolonged and large debt accumulations. Falling interest rates and subsequently government interest payments helped the debt reductions in the 1990s. In some countries, at the beginning of debt reductions, interest payments amounted to at least 5% of GDP and in Belgium and Canada around 10% of GDP, crowding out other spending.

Fiscal rules and frameworks encouraged actions to reduce debt. In several EU countries, the requirement to fulfil the Maastricht fiscal criteria (budget deficit no higher than 3% of GDP and government debt below 60% of GDP) ahead of adoption of the euro contributed to public debt reductions. In Canada, to help deal with large budget deficits of provincial and federal governments in the early-1990s, many provinces voluntarily adopted fiscal rules. The Federal government introduced the Spending Control Act between 1992 and 1995 and since then has generally used non-legislated fiscal targets, helping to achieve high budget surpluses in the subsequent years. In New Zealand, fiscal discipline was accompanied by the introduction of a new budgetary framework (the 1994 Fiscal Responsibility Act), building on responsible fiscal management principles. The Act also enforced greater transparency about the fiscal situation and fiscal policies.

Negative economic shocks. In a few countries, severe economic crises required fiscal adjustments, thereby securing popular support for adjustment. For instance, in Finland the deep recession following a financial crisis in the early 1990s prompted the government to implement large cuts in government spending (including social benefits, public sector wages, subsidies, investment, and transfers to sub-central governments), with the aim to restore confidence in financial markets and to achieve a non-inflationary recovery. The impact of these measures on debt reduction was strengthened by the move to a floating exchange rate that led to a sharp depreciation of the local currency. In Sweden, the severe banking and economic crises in the early 1990s led the government to implement several structural reforms covering governance of the public finances, tax reforms, liberalisation of the economy, reforming the welfare state (pensions especially), and promoting an export-oriented growth model. However, we should acknowledge that for these countries, favourable global economic conditions boosted exports, contributing to the resumption of economic growth and debt reduction.

References

Molnár, M. (2012), “Fiscal consolidation: What factors determine the success of consolidation efforts?”, OECD Journal: Economic Studies, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco_studies-2012-5k8zs3twgmjc.

Rawdanowicz, Ł. et al. (2021), “Constraints and demands on public finances: Considerations of resilient fiscal policy”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1694, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/602500be-en.

By Yvan Guillemette, OECD Economics Department

The decline in economic activity associated with caution, lockdowns and other restrictions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic brought government revenue down substantially in 2020 across the OECD. Governments have appropriately responded with a range of temporary programmes to support workers and businesses, simultaneously raising expenditure. Consequently, fiscal positions have deteriorated sharply and gross government debt in the OECD is projected to be around 20-25 percentage points of GDP higher in 2022 than it would have been absent the pandemic.

The immediate fiscal challenge for governments is to continue to target fiscal support towards sectors hardest hit by the COVID-19 shock and, as the pandemic ebbs, to phase out temporary programmes gradually along with the restrictions that limit doing business in these sectors. In the longer run, however, the direct fiscal impact of the pandemic pales in comparison to additional fiscal pressures stemming from secular trends, such as population ageing and the rising relative price of services.

In the latest long-run projections from the OECD Economics Department, these fiscal pressures are assessed using stylised projections that take secular trends, such as demographics, into account. The idea is not to obtain precise forecasts, but rather rough orders of magnitude to size up the fiscal challenge ahead. Under a ‘business-as-usual’ hypothesis, in which no major reforms to government programmes are undertaken:

• Public health and long-term care expenditure is projected to increase by 2.2 percentage points of GDP in the median country between 2021 and 2060 (see figure). These projections are based on a pre-pandemic health and long-term care spending baseline, so any permanent increase in health spending in response to experience with COVID-19 (for instance to build more spare capacity in intensive care units or raise pay levels for workers in public care homes) would come in addition.
• Public pension expenditure is projected to increase by 2.8 percentage points of GDP in the median country between 2021 and 2060, but cross-country variability is much higher than in the case of health expenditure projections. Countries that have legislated increases in statutory retirement ages, and especially those that have linked future increases to gains in life expectancy — such as Estonia, the Netherlands and Portugal — tend to have lower projected increases in public pension expenditure, whereas countries with particularly unfavourable demographics — such as Japan, Korea and Poland — tend to have higher projected spending increases.
• Other primary expenditures are projected to rise by 1½ percentage points of GDP in the median country between 2021 and 2060. And this figure excludes important sources of expenditure pressure, such as climate change adaptation.
• In contrast to the fiscal pressures from the secular trends discussed above, the additional debt service on the increase in public debt due to the COVID-19 pandemic – here approximated by the increase in gross government debt between 2019 and 2022 – adds only about ½ percentage point of GDP to long-run fiscal pressure in the median country. Emergency fiscal transfers during the COVID period contribute little to long-run fiscal pressure because they are temporary. Their permanent component is the flow of interest payments on the associated stock of additional debt, assuming that it is permanently rolled over, which is the case here because of the assumption that the government debt-to-GDP ratio is stabilised at its 2022 level.

Potential future fiscal pressure to keep public debt ratio at current level in the baseline scenario

Change in fiscal pressure between 2021 and 2060, % pts of potential GDP

Except in Greece, where a massive fiscal consolidation effort has already taken place since the Great Recession, all OECD governments would need to undertake fiscal consolidation in this scenario, which is premised on the idea that fiscal authorities would seek to stabilise public debt ratios at projected 2022 levels by adjusting structural primary revenue from 2023 onward. The median country would need to increase structural primary revenue by nearly 8 percentage points of GDP between 2021 and 2060, but the effort would exceed 10 percentage points in 11 countries. These results do not imply that taxes will, or even should, rise in the future. The fiscal pressure indicator is simply a metric serving to quantify and illustrate the fiscal challenge facing OECD governments. Raising taxes is only one of many possible avenues to meet this challenge.

If financing conditions remain favourable, as assumed in the baseline scenario, countries with relatively low initial public debt ratios could finance some of the projected increases in expenditure with debt. With higher public debt would come risks, however. For this reasons, absorbing future fiscal pressure with additional borrowing is a strategy that could postpone, but probably not avoid, the need for policy reforms.

Another avenue would be reforming health and pension systems to increase efficiency and prevent expenditure from rising as much as projected in this stylised exercise. In addition, structural reforms that raise employment rates are associated with substantial fiscal dividends. In the context of slowing global population growth and even declining population in many countries, labour market reforms that would raise employment and encourage longer working lives appear particularly desirable. In addition to reducing fiscal pressure, such reforms align well with the goal of helping women and disadvantaged groups gain employment. As the report demonstrates, combining labour market policy reforms with increases in average effective retirement ages could halve the projected increase in fiscal pressure in the median OECD country through 2060 (of nearly 8 percentage points of GDP).

Reference

Guillemette, Y. and D. Turner (2021), “The long game: Fiscal outlooks to 2060 underline need for structural reform”, OECD Economic Policy Papers, No. 29, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a112307e-en.

By Patrick Lenain, Carl Romer and Ben Westmore

The American Rescue Plan (ARP) submitted by President Biden and approved by U.S. Congress in mid-March provides US$1.84 trillion (8.4% of GDP) of fiscal support to the economy — a very large stimulus by international standards. Soon after the plan’s approval, the OECD Interim Economic Outlook presented a significant upward revision to the U.S. economic growth forecast, doubling it for 2021 from 3.2% to 6.5%. The fiscal package will boost domestic demand and help activity return more quickly to pre-pandemic levels (Figure 1), with many unemployed workers getting back jobs. Furthermore, OECD modelling highlights that the package may have noteworthy demand spillovers for the major trading partners of the U.S. (for further details, see The American Rescue Plan is set to boost global growth).

Figure 1: U.S. GDP projections
(trillion of US dollars, constant prices)

Source: OECD Economic Outlook projections.

While concerns have been raised that such a large fiscal stimulus could cause a significant future inflation shock, the transformative content of the measures in the package should not be overlooked. As recommended by successive OECD Economic Surveys of the United States, the ARP seeks to address persistent structural challenges that have prevented many Americans from realising their human potential. The Plan will help struggling subnational governments, support unemployed workers, facilitate the reopening of schools, close gaps in unemployment insurance, and reduce child poverty. Besides sending checks of $1400 to eligible families (budget cost of US$412 billion), the Plan contains other important provisions (Figure 2).    

Figure 2 – American Rescue Plan’s main provisions*

Source: Authors’ compilation from various sources.*
Estimates based on available information and subject to changes.

• Support to subnational governments (US$350 billion). The ARP allocates financial support to States, territories and tribes. States that depend on tourism and sales taxes like Hawaii, Nevada, Florida, Texas have faced steeper budget shortfalls, whereas other states like Idaho and Utah saw large revenue increases owing to strong federal expenditures and relatively short COVID-19 lockdowns. As argued in past OECD work, subnational governments play key social and economic roles, but existing fiscal rules can impose damaging spending cuts during recessions.
• Unemployment relief (US$246 billion). The Plan provides Federal funding to supplement state-level unemployment insurance benefits with an additional $300 per week – less than the supplement of $600 per week in the CARES Act but nonetheless important, as these benefits would otherwise have fallen back to low pre-crisis levels. By supporting unemployment insurance, the ARP will help to keep unemployed workers active in the labour market, rather than becoming discouraged from job search, as seen in past recessions.
• Support to schools and higher education (US$170 billion). Manyschools had to close during shutdown orders, with detrimental impacts on vulnerable families and the risk of large numbers of dropouts. K-12 Schools will be given US$125 billion in direct aid with another US$40 billion for colleges and universities to reopen in safe conditions. Reducing gaps in educational outcomes, as measured by PISA, has been a recurring OECD policy recommendation.
• Child benefits and affordable childcare (US$156 billion). A persistent challenge for families has been the absence of affordable childcare, which has depressed the labor-market participation of American women. Also, the lack of affordable early-childhood education, which is decisive in children’s school performance, has created large inequalities. The ARP provides emergency funding for child-care assistance to essential workers unable to telework, typically people in low-income deciles. The Plan also helps 16 million poor and rural K-12 students without access to high-speed internet. The Child Tax Credit and Earned Income Tax Credit will receive a much-needed boost: the Urban Institute projects that this will cut child poverty in half.
• Health insurance coverage, vaccines and COVID-19 containment (US$125 billion). PastOECD work has recommended closing existing gaps in healthcare insurance, working towards universal coverage through a system of multiple insurance providers. For employees laid off or who otherwise lost their health insurance, ARP provides US$57 billion in funding for employers to retain COBRA coverage for departing employees and a temporary expansion in subsidies that could be used to pay for health coverage through the Affordable Care Act public exchange system. In addition, ARP increases marketplace premium subsidies for people at every income level and will now be offered to those with income above 4 times the federal poverty level.

While these measures are temporary, the OECD has recommended permanent reforms to alleviate child poverty, improve K-12 education, close gaps in health insurance, and strengthen local communities – all with a beneficial impact on long-term economic growth and well-being. Other reforms recommended by the OECD include wider access to high-speed internet; investment in green technologies; and strengthening anti-trust actions to protect consumers against oligopolies’ market dominance.

President Biden has now turned his attention to implementing new policies to boost investment, which could have a fiscal cost of at least US$3 trillion spread across several years. Notwithstanding the risk of political gridlock, this provides the opportunity to further address long standing challenges, including those reform priorities previously identified by the OECD in the areas of infrastructure, green technologies and education.

References

OECD (2021), “The need for speed: Putting the World Economy on the Fast Track out of the COVID-19 crisis”, ECOSCOPE blog, 17 March.

OECD (2020), Economic Survey of the United States, OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/12323be9-en

Azzopardi, D., F. Fareed, M. Hermansen, P. Lenain and D. Sutherland (2020), “The decline in labour mobility in the United States: Insights from new administrative data

Azzopardi, D., F. Fareed, M. Hermansen, P. Lenain and D. Sutherland (2020), “Why are some U.S. cities successful, while others are not? Empirical evidence from machine learning”, OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 1643.

Laurence Boone, Chief Economist, OECD and Marco Buti, Director General, DG Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission

After years of solid growth, worldwide economic activity has slowed down sharply in 2019 while global trade has stalled. Policymakers have the difficult task of addressing the immediate policy challenges to support economic growth while also preparing our economies for the future. This column argues that while monetary policy is widely recognised as facing increasing constraints, fiscal policy and structural reforms need to play a stronger role. In particular, fiscal policy could become more supportive, notably in the euro area. Undertaking the right type of public investment now – in infrastructure, education or to mitigate climate change – would both stimulate our economies and contribute to making them stronger and more sustainable.

Over the past few years, economies in the OECD and in particular in the EU had been growing at cruising speed, after having seemingly shrugged off the remains of the global financial crisis. The US is experiencing its longest bout of uninterrupted positive GDP growth on record. Similarly, despite lower growth performance, the EU has been growing for 25 quarters and its unemployment rate is now at its lowest since 2000.

Yet, worldwide growth has been decelerating sharply in 2019, dragged by a global trade and investment slump along with, in Europe and most notably in Germany, a steep drop in manufacturing activity. Recent indicators suggest that growth could weaken further (IMF 2019). Rising uncertainty has been driving this slowdown, as a result of increasing economic tensions between China and the US, geopolitical developments in the Middle East (with the associated risk of a sharp rise in oil prices), and the political deadlock over Brexit. The materialisation of these risks could put the world economy on a collision course. Even if they remain only looming threats, high and increasingly entrenched uncertainty is sufficient to put a brake on investment and growth.

The impact of these tensions is exacerbated by a number of structural developments, in particular in Europe. The drop in potential growth, evident since the 2000s, has prompted concerns of ‘secular stagnation’ affecting the US and Europe. An important driver could be the slow diffusion of technologies: as Anzoategui et al (2019) argue, much of the slowdown in productivity after the recession can be attributed to lower technology adoption. In addition, demographic change is taking a toll on growth potential while the appetite for reforms has slowed.

A better policy set-up is needed to lift economies back to growth

The conjunction of cyclical and structural impediments to growth calls for a review of the customary economic policy response to a deteriorating economic climate. Current inflation and policy rates, which are expected to remain at their low levels, suggest that ever more accommodative monetary policy will not be enough to revive GDP growth. At the same time, nominal GDP growth rates being above interest rates paid on public debt for most countries, and set to remain there for long, increase the space for public investment.

Since the outset of the financial crisis, monetary policy has remained exceptionally accommodative, bringing interest rates close to zero (see Figure 2). In particular, the Fed continues to take expansionary measures, while the Bank of Japan maintains an extraordinary degree of monetary accommodation. Zooming in on the euro area, the ECB announced a fresh stimulus package in September as it cut the deposit rate further by 10 basis points and relaunched its quantitative easing (QE) programme, together with expanded forward guidance. However, monetary policy faces increasing constraints.

The other policy instruments in the toolbox – both fiscal and structural – thus need to help. Together with the structural reforms needed to lift productivity durably, public investment could be put to use to halt the ongoing slowdown and prepare the ground for stronger and more sustainable economies. In fact, the same factors that constrain monetary policy are a bonanza for fiscal policy, which jointly with structural reforms can lift growth in a sustainable way.

Fiscal interventions are more powerful when inflationary pressures are low and monetary policy is likely to accommodate fiscal expansions as long as inflation remains below target. The euro area as a whole has fiscal room to manoeuvre, even though the situation differs markedly across countries. But while the slowdown is becoming entrenched, under current plans, fiscal levers are not being activated: on average in the euro area, the fiscal stance is expected to be broadly neutral in the next two years.

At the same time, the appetite for reforms with potential to lift growth and employment in the longer term – such as easing barriers to entrepreneurship, improving and expanding training, and supporting R&D and technology adoption – has waned, as shown by the implementation of the Going for Growth recommendations (OECD 2019a) or EU country-specific recommendations. Yet, such reforms are needed to reverse the slowdown in productivity that started even before the crisis but was exacerbated by the hysteresis effects of the Great Recession on investment and skills. Structural reforms are also needed to make growth more environmentally sustainable, by aligning policies and regulation with the goal of transition to a low-carbon economy (OECD 2015).

In addition, reforms are easier to implement when accompanied by a supportive policy mix, while in times of faltering demand, structural reforms alone may weigh on inflation and already weak demand (Eggertsson et al. 2014). In effect, reforms introduced when the economy is weak have a better chance of succeeding when undertaken together with supportive macroeconomic policies and renewed public investment, and when they put more weight on measures that also boost demand in the short term, such as strengthening job search assistance and training and improving the tax structure (Caldera Sanchez et al. 2016). Simulations on the euro area run by the OECD for its Economic Outlook illustrate how combining a temporary public investment push with productivity-enhancing reforms can help bring forward the long-term benefits of reforms (OECD 2019b,c).

There is a strong case for a more supportive fiscal policy in the euro area

In the euro area, the inadequacy of a policy mix relying exceedingly on the monetary policy pillar is becoming particularly obvious, as notably emphasised by the institution itself (Draghi 2019). Meanwhile, the ‘reflationary’ efforts conducted by the ECB are meeting increasing resistance both within and outside the institution.

Consequently, the usual arguments for relying mainly on automatic budgetary stabilisers and monetary policy when dealing with adverse shocks to the euro area may have to be reconsidered. In particular, modelling work done by the European Commission (In’t Veld 2019) shows that when monetary policy is constrained by the zero-rate floor, fiscal stimulus has a stronger impact on growth in the short term and a more benign effect on the debt ratio in the long term.

While the benefits of a more supportive fiscal policy already appear sizeable at the current juncture, depending on how events unfold, the failure to act could result in snowballing negative effects going much beyond those captured in the usual simulations. In particular, the lack of action may increase the risk of the economy moving to inferior equilibria where deteriorating expectations of growth, employment and price developments, as well as private sector balance sheet effects, may further add to the current downward spiral. In these circumstances, the costs of too little stimulus in a worsening economy are likely to outweigh the costs of too much stimulus should a more favourable scenario materialise. The large compounded downward risks call for a risk-based approach to fiscal policy, with more pre-emptive rather than reactive policy action.

In absence of a common euro area budget, the current situation offers an opportunity for a truly coordinated approach to a supportive but differentiated fiscal stance in the 2020 budget plans. A more active role for fiscal policy in the policy mix would require differentiation between Member States with fiscal space and Member States with high debt, taking into account the divergent sustainability challenges. Furthermore, it is also important to improve the quality and composition of public finances, in particular boosting investment to ease the climate transition, and step up structural reforms.

Illustrative simulations with the Commission’s QUEST model suggest that an increase in public investment of 1% of GDP for two years in Member States with fiscal space, with monetary policy at the zero lower bound, leads to GDP increases of around 1% during that period in the concerned Member States and slightly less for more open economies (Figure 3). In the medium run, even after the stimulus has been removed, output remains above the baseline due to productivity gains from higher investment. Spillovers to other euro area Member States are modest at around 0.1-0.2% of GDP. The resulting effects of a temporary fiscal stimulus on debt to GDP ratios are benign, thanks to higher growth. In the Member States with fiscal space, the debt-to-GDP ratio would increase around by 1½ percentage points in the short run, fading out in the long run. A more persistent expansion in public investment in surplus countries, which would correct past cutbacks, would give a bigger boost to the euro area economy, with larger spillovers to other countries and still a manageable increase in debt ratios compared to the baseline scenario (In’t Veld 2016). Where interest rates are negative, as is presently the case for most countries, the debt dynamics are even more favourable.

High fiscal multipliers and benign effects on debt developments rely on the nature of the fiscal impulse. Investment spending, which supports the economy’s productive capacity and is time-limited in nature, has a stronger impact. A differentiated investment stimulus in line with the spirit of the EU fiscal framework would be most effective.

Now is the time to invest in stronger and more sustainable economies for the future

The case for a more active use of fiscal policy is not only rooted in the critical role it must play to drag weak economies out of the risk zone. The current situation also offers an opportunity not to be missed to address deep economic challenges and invest in the future. The low interest rates at which governments are borrowing, even at long maturities, mean that many of them can more easily undertake investments to raise long-term growth, sustainability and wellbeing without putting strain on public finances.

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, governments often resorted to cuts in public investment to achieve fiscal consolidation in a way deemed less painful than raising taxes or cutting social spending or the public sector wage bill. Throughout the post-crisis period, this shortfall in public investment has not been made up for. A decade of infrastructures that were not built or were not properly maintained has been taking its toll on productivity and growth potential. It risks turning into persistently missed chances to better connect people, firms and regions to opportunities.

Some countries, such as Germany, are in dire need of stronger investment. Across the EU, almost half of firms are held back in their investment decisions by the inadequacy of transport infrastructure, and the same number by the lack of access to digital infrastructure (Figure 4). High-speed networks are the backbone of a knowledge economy and a pre-condition for firms to innovate and thrive in the near future. Bridging the rural digital divide is also key to reduce regional disparities and improve social cohesion. Further investment in health, education and skills would also support a more durable and more inclusive growth.

At the same time, the need to invest in greening our economies is becoming ever more pressing, as delaying action will entail steeply rising costs of climate change mitigation (IPCC 2018). The growing scale and reach of climate-motivated demonstrations and civil disobedience actions in recent months have given a political urgency to the issue. The energy transition will require more investments – and different investments than under the current trajectory – to decarbonise entire sectors starting with energy, industry and transport. In the EU, President-elect van der Leyen has announced a “Green Deal” to accelerate the transition towards achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 (van der Leyen 2019). Such an initiative could mobilise public and private resources to lift innovation and investment in low-carbon technologies and build more sustainable economies.

Authors’ note: The authors are writing in their personal capacity and their opinions should not be attributed to the OECD or the European Commission. They would like to thank Dorothée Rouzet (OECD), Sven Langedijk and Nicolas Philiponnet (both European Commission) for their support and assistance on this column. 

This post was previously released on 18 October 2019 on the VOX CEPR Policy Portal

References

Anzoategui D, D Comin, M Gertler and J Martinez (2019), “Endogenous Technology Adoption and R&D as Sources of Business Cycle Persistence,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 11(3): 67-110.

Caldera Sánchez, A, A de Serres and N Yashiro (2016), “Reforming in a difficult macroeconomic context: A review of the issues and recent literature“, OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 1297.

Draghi M (2019), Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, Brussels, 23 September.  

Eggertsson G, A Ferrero and A Raffo (2014), “Can structural reforms help Europe?”, Journal of Monetary Economics 61: 2-22.

European Investment Bank (2018), EIB Investment Survey. 

IMF (2019), World Economic Outlook 2019: Global Manufacturing Downturn, Rising Trade Barriers, October. 

In’t Veld, J. (2016), “Public Investment Stimulus in Surplus Countries and their Euro Area Spillovers”, Economic Brief N°16, European Economy. 

In’t Veld, J. (2019), “Productive spending and public debt in a low interest rate environment”, mimeo. 

IPCC (2018), Global Warming of 1.5 ºC.

OECD (2015), Aligning Policies for a Low-carbon Economy, OECD Publishing.

OECD (2019a), Economic Policy Reforms 2019: Going for Growth, OECD Publishing.  

OECD (2019b), OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2019 Issue 1, OECD Publishing.  

OECD (2019c), OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report September 2019, OECD Publishing.

Von der Leyen, U (2019), “A Union that strive for more – Political guidelines for the next European Commission 2019-2024”, European Commission.82

Jan Stráský and Guillaume Claveres, OECD Economics Department, Euro Area/EU desk

The euro area sovereign debt crisis has exposed important flaws in the design of the Economic and Monetary Union, especially when it comes to dealing with macroeconomic shocks. Compared to federal states, fiscal transfers at the euro area and EU level are virtually non-existent. Since labour mobility remains low, private risk sharing in the euro area mainly takes place through cross-border flows of capital and credit, which may not always be sufficient to deal with large negative shocks.

The lack of effective risk-sharing is particularly damaging in a monetary union, where countries cannot use independent monetary policy or exchange rate depreciation to support growth and employment and national fiscal policies in some countries may be unable, in the short run, to deal with country-specific shocks through national counter-cyclical policies. Moreover, monetary policy may become overburdened even when dealing with common shocks. During the financial crisis, contagion effects and negative feedback loops between sovereigns and banks threatened price stability and forced the ECB to reduce policy interest rates to below zero, coming probably close to an effective constraint for monetary policy. Even though the ECB put in place other unconventional measures, such as asset purchases, to ensure transmission of its policy, these measures are not without costs and limits.

The weak potential growth and inflation outlook for the euro area, as well as the global shifts in saving and investment preferences, also suggest that nominal interest rates may stay close to zero for a prolonged period of time and return close to zero more often in the future (Rachel and Smith, 2017).

In this situation, where the ECB monetary policy may remain constrained for some time and fiscal space limited in some countries, a common fiscal stabilisation instrument would improve the policy toolkit. Our recent paper,  Euro area unemployment insurance at the time of zero nominal interest rates  simulating a general equilibrium model of the euro area with imperfect risk-sharing mechanisms shows that a fiscal capacity, in the form of a common unemployment benefit scheme, can significantly improve macroeconomic stabilisation when the monetary policy constraints become binding.

Building a common fiscal stabilisation instrument for the euro area is an important topic of the 2018 Economic Survey of the Euro Area. The concept of a common fiscal instrument goes back at least to the 1970s Marjolin’s Report and the interest in the topic has been rekindled post-crisis by several concrete proposals, including the IMF’s rainy-day fund (Arnold et al., 2018), the European Commission’s investment protection scheme (European Commission, 2017) and several variants of unemployment insurance and re-insurance schemes (Beblavý and Lenaerts, 2017; Dullien et al., 2018). However, such schemes face significant resistance, due to the fears of permanent transfers towards some countries that would reduce incentives to carry out structural reforms. To overcome these criticisms, the scheme must avoid permanent transfers among countries, a condition made explicit in the Five President’s Report.

Our companion paper, Stabilising the euro area through an unemployment benefits re-insurance scheme, discusses a novel design for a common fiscal stabilisation instrument, in the form of an unemployment benefits re-insurance scheme. As other recently proposed mechanisms (European Commission, 2017), the scheme is activated according only when unemployment increase and is above its long-term average, and involves a cap in payments, ensuring that pay-outs to individual countries are limited. These features, together with a mechanism charging higher contributions to countries that draw more frequently on the fund (experience rating), effectively prevent permanent transfers in the medium term.

Using counterfactual simulations of the proposed mechanism for individual euro area countries on annual data from 2000 to 2016, we show that the scheme would have delivered considerable stabilisation gains, both at the individual country level and euro area level (Figure 1). Macroeconomic stabilisation would be timely in most cases and achieved at the cost of limited debt issuance (less than 2% of the euro area GDP) and average annual contributions not exceeding 0.17% of GDP (Figure 2). It would have also avoided permanent transfers among countries, as none of them would have been a major net contributor or receiver with respect to the scheme, and all countries would have benefited from the scheme at one point in time.

References:

Arnold, M., Barkbu, M., Ture, H., Wang, H. and J. Yao (2018), “A central fiscal stabilization capacity for the Euro Area”, IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/18/03 , International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Staff-Discussion-Notes/Issues/2018/03/22/A-Central-Fiscal-Stabilization-Capacity-for-the-Euro-Area-45741

Beblavý, M. and K. Lenaerts (2017), “Feasibility and added value of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme”, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/EUBS%20final.pdf

Claveres, G. and J. Stráský (2018a), “Euro area unemployment insurance at the time of zero nominal interest rates”, OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 1498, OECD Publishing, Paris.

Claveres, G. and J. Stráský (2018b), “Stabilising the euro area through an unemployment benefits re-insurance scheme”, OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 1497, OECD Publishing, Paris.

Dullien, S., Fernández, J., López, M., Maass, G., del Prado, D., & von Weizsäcker, J. (2018), Fit for purpose: a German-Spanish proposal for a robust European Unemployment Insurance. http://www.fes-madrid.org/media/2017_FESpublicaciones/Arbeitslosenversicherung_doc.pdf

European Commission (2017), New budgetary instruments for a stable euro area within the Union framework, Communication from the Commission COM(2017) 822 final. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/com_822_0.pdf

OECD (2018), OECD Economic Surveys: Euro Area 2018, OECD Publishing, Paris.

by Sean Dougherty, Senior Advisor, OECD Fiscal Network

Over the last decade or more, many countries have experienced slowing productivity growth and a rising concentration of income. Concerns about these developments have motivated a broadening of the policy discussion about how to ensure that economic growth is made more inclusive and multidimensional. One important channel for addressing these concerns is through intergovernmental fiscal relations. By providing the “right” incentives and improving rules and practices in policy making, these institutions can shape fiscal policy and multidimensional outcomes at all government levels. The OECD Fiscal Network has recently published a volume covering these topics.

Design of decentralisation, reform options and the impact on outcomes

Earlier work published in the Fiscal Federalism Studies has shown that the stage of economic development and political economy constraints play important roles in determining the success of fiscal decentralisation. Rather than rely on unique prescriptions, policymakers should consider the importance of institutional complementarities to reap the full potential of fiscal decentralisation. The volume reinforces this message, and demonstrates the importance of considering country specificities in addition to policy design principles when reforming intergovernmental institutions and transfer systems.

Several chapters therein address the basic design of fiscal federalism and associated reforms. One overarching finding is that balanced decentralisation – that is, when the various policy functions are decentralised to a similar extent – is conducive to growth. Similarly, the efficiency of public service delivery in education and health is found to be conditional on sufficient political and institutional capacity. Balanced decentralisation allows sub-national governments to better co-ordinate policy and to reap economies of scale and scope across functions. Moreover, a country’s scope for achieving growth that is also inclusive varies widely depending on its characteristics and its public finance mix.

Spending and revenue decentralisation tends to boost economic growth for economies that have a relatively higher degree of globalisation, based on the analysis in this book. Fiscal decentralisation has a more ambiguous effect on inequality than on growth, especially for economies with a higher degree of openness. Moreover, for some countries, there is an apparent trade-off between growth and equity, when it comes to the “optimal” degree of spending and revenue decentralisation.

A potential trade-off between efficiency and inequality is also examined in an analysis of education financing decisions, which looks at the link between local education funding and inequality. However, a range of country-specific policies tend to offset potential trade-offs.

“Design is in the details”

Given the complexity of cross-country results, the chapters include detailed examinations of various aspects of intergovernmental relations in Korea, the Netherlands, India and the United Kingdom. These analyses broadly mirror the cross-country findings, yet they also qualify them in terms of the difficulties in achieving various objectives. For instance, the analysis of Korea’s education financing system finds that it could benefit from more decentralised financing, both in terms of overall outcomes and equity. Empirically, heightened inequality tends to induce more spending on educational opportunitites for lower income populations. This analysis also finds that lower-scoring populations benefit the most from enhanced public educational investment.

Modelling of the Netherlands’ tax system shows that the design of local revenue collection, such as on immovable property, can have substantial distributional effects. Policy scenarios in which the tax burden is shifted towards immovable property show that the tax shift can yield a moderately positive impact on employment, minimising the distributional effects.

Empirical estimates of India’s transfer system suggests that special transfers do not achieve the objective of providing a more comparable level of public services across states at different income levels. While special purpose transfers are intended to ensure a minimum standard, the analysis finds that there are too many specific purpose transfers, and these are poorly targeted. A reform of the fiscal transfer system is suggested.

In a simulation of the UK’s local finances, not only the mix of funding sources matters for incentives, but the rules around tax and fee policy matter. Even if revenues are initially fully equalised relative to assessed spending needs, significant fiscal disparities can re-emerge in just a few years. Examining the trade-offs between equalisation and incentives inherent in sub-national finance reveals the importance of design choices.

The volume includes both cross-country studies and insights into reforms from individual countries, with several chapters written by experts closely involved in both institutional reform and the day-to-day operation of fiscal relations. The studies show how much the design of policy and institutions matters, even if reforms often happen slowly. The book is a sequel to Institutions of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations: Challenges Ahead (OECD and KIPF, 2015), broadening and deepening the issues covered there. It also provides insights and experiences from academics and practitioners on key aspects of intergovernmental fiscal relations and how they contribute to inclusive growth. Discussions were fostered by the annual meetings of the OECD Network on Fiscal Relations Across Levels of Government.

References:

OECD and KIPF (2018), Fiscal Decentralisation and Inclusive Growth, OECD Publishing, Paris.

By Alessandro Maravalle and Lukasz Rawdanowicz, OECD Economics Department

Low interest rates prevailing in many advanced economies in recent years have already helped to lower the debt servicing burden, but government debt and interest payments remain large in many OECD countries. Could a further reduction in interest payments be attained by “locking-in” current low interest rates?

The answer is not straightforward as it depends on the future evolution of yield curves and budget balances, which are difficult to predict, and initial conditions related to the level and maturity structure of public debt.

To shed some light on potential debt servicing effects of changing debt maturity, we undertook country‑specific stylised simulations over the next 30 years with different assumptions about the maturity of new debt (Maravalle and Rawdanowicz, 2018). We analyse in principle two alternative debt strategies: temporary lengthening of the debt maturity of newly issued debt, i.e. up to a few years only, and permanent shortening, i.e. for 30 years. In both cases, the average debt maturity of newly issued debt changes by one year compared with the initial country-specific average remaining debt maturity.

The simulations are calibrated to reflect several key characteristics of G7 economies, in particular the current debt maturity structure and fiscal positions. We assume that interest rates will increase and the yield curve will steepen gradually during the first five years and then stabilise afterwards. Such a stylised assumption reflects the expected normalisation of monetary policy.

It turns out that, with the assumed increase in interest rates, a temporary lengthening of the debt maturity would not bring any reduction in debt servicing costs (figure below). The assumed initial increases in interest rates and in the slope of the yield curve are not gradual enough to reap the benefit of locking-in low interest rates. As debt matures gradually over time, the yield curve must remain low and flat for a prolonged period to reduce the overall debt servicing costs in the long term when interest rates will be higher. However, even with a more gradual and protracted interest rate normalisation, such potential fiscal benefits would be still negligible. Nevertheless, lengthening of debt maturity could be motivated by reducing rollover risks or accommodating demand from investors.

In contrast, shortening debt maturity could have non-negligible fiscal benefits for most G7 countries (figure below), but this would come at the cost of higher rollover risks. Gains could be particularly large for countries with high debt and relatively steep yield curves.

Whatever the change in debt maturity and the scenario for the evolution of the yield curve, fiscal gains would materialise only after the first decade, not helping much to lower current budget deficits.

Reference

Maravalle, A. and L. Rawdanowicz (2018), “To shorten or to lengthen? Public debt management in the low‑interest rate environment”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1483, OECD Publishing, Paris,

By Álvaro S. Pereira, OECD Chief Economist ad interim, Economics Department

After a lengthy period of weak growth, the world economy is finally growing around 4%, the historical average of the past few decades.

This is good news. And this news is even better knowing that, in part, the stronger growth of the world economy is supported by a welcome rebound in investment and in world trade. The recovery in investment is particularly worth emphasising, since the fate of the current expansion will be highly dependent on how investment will perform.

Although long anticipated, the pick-up in investment remains weaker than in past expansions. The same is true for global trade, which is expected to grow at a respectable, albeit not spectacular, rate, unless it is derailed by trade tensions.

However, contrary to previous periods, 4% world growth is not due to rising productivity gains or sweeping structural change. This time around the stronger economy is largely due to monetary and fiscal policy support.

For many years, monetary policy was the only game in town. During the international financial crisis, central banks cut interest rates aggressively, injected funds into the economy and purchased assets at a record pace in an attempt to boost the economy.

In contrast, in most countries, fiscal policy remained prudent or even became contractionary. Still, historically low interest rates provided an opportunity for governments to use their available fiscal space to help foster growth, as the OECD argued forcefully in 2016. Many OECD governments are now following this advice. At first, the resources enabled by lower interest payments were used by governments to avoid cutting expenditures or raising taxes. With the improving economic situation, many governments have started to undertake additional fiscal easing.

Now that monetary policy is finally starting to return to normal, governments are stepping in to provide fiscal policy support. We can say that fiscal policy is the new game in town: three quarters of OECD countries are now undertaking fiscal easing. The fiscal stimulus in some countries is very significant, while it is less ambitious in other countries. Still, this fiscal easing will have important repercussions for the world economy. In the short run, it will add to growth. However, countries that have been experiencing longer expansions might find that this fiscal stimulus (where it is large) will also add to inflationary pressures in the medium term. Only time will tell if these short-run gains might be offset by some medium-term pain. What matters is that, in making these choices, governments are fully aware of the medium-term impact of their policies, and do not focus only on the short-term benefits from fiscal stimulus.

The strong growth we are witnessing is also associated with robust job creation in many economies. In fact, it is particularly satisfying to see that in the OECD area, unemployment is set to reach its lowest level since 1980, even though it remains high in some countries. Thanks to this robust job creation and the related intensifying labour shortages, we are now projecting a rise in real wages in many countries. This increase is still somewhat modest. However, there are clear signs that wages are finally on the way up. This is an important development, since the global crisis had a severe impact on household incomes, particularly for the unskilled and low-income workers.

In spite of all this good news, risks loom large for the global outlook. What are these risks? First and foremost, an escalation of trade tensions should be avoided. It is worth remembering that, in part, the rise in trade restrictions is nothing new. After all, more than 1200 new trade restrictions have been implemented by G20 countries since the outset of the global financial crisis in 2007. Still, as outlined in Chapter 2, since the world economy is much more integrated and linked today than in the past, a further escalation of trade tensions might significantly affect the economic expansion and disrupt vital global value chains.

Another important risk going forward is related to the rise in oil prices. Oil prices have risen by close to 50% over the past year. Persistently higher oil prices will push up inflationary pressures and will aggravate external imbalances in many countries.

In the past few years, very low interest rates have encouraged borrowing by households and corporations in some countries and led to overvaluation of assets (e.g. houses, equities) in many others. In this context, rising interest rates might be challenging for highly indebted countries, families and corporations. Of course, this rise in interest rates has been widely anticipated and should thus not cause any major disruptions. Nevertheless, if inflation rises more than expected and central banks are forced to raise rates at a faster pace, it is likely that market sentiment could shift abruptly, leading to a sudden correction in asset prices.

A swifter rise in interest rates in advanced economies might also continue to lead to significant currency depreciation and volatility in some emerging market economies (EMEs) that are highly reliant on external financing and facing internal or external imbalances. Geopolitical tensions might also contribute to sudden market corrections or a further rise in oil prices. Brexit and policy uncertainty in Italy could add pressures to the expansion in the euro area.

What does this all mean for policy? Since private and public debt remain high in some countries, improving productivity, decreasing debt levels and building fiscal buffers is key to strengthen the resilience of economies. As monetary and fiscal policies will not be able to sustain the expansion forever and might even contribute to financial risks, it is absolutely essential that structural reforms become a priority. In the past couple of years, few countries have undertaken substantial structural reforms. Most of the countries that reformed are large EMEs, such as Argentina, Brazil and India. In the advanced economies, important labour reforms were introduced in France and a sweeping tax reform was implemented in the United States. However, as the 2018 OECD Going for Growth points out, these important exceptions do not counter the rule that reform efforts have been lagging.

Why is this important? Because the only way to sustain the current expansion and to make growth work for all is to undertake productivity-enhancing reforms. As many OECD Education Policy Reviews and OECD National Skills Strategies show, it is crucial to redesign curricula to develop the cognitive, social and emotional skills that enable success at work, and to improve teaching quality and the resources necessary to deliver those skills effectively. In many countries, investment in quality early childhood education and vocational education and apprenticeships are of particular importance. Skills-enhancing labour-market reforms are also crucial. Reforms to boost competition, improve insolvency regimes, reduce barriers to entry in services and cut red tape are also key for making our economies more dynamic, more inclusive and more entrepreneurial. Investment in digital infrastructure will also be essential in this digital age. In addition, there are significant opportunities to reduce trade costs in both goods and, in particular, services, boosting growth and jobs across the world.

In spite of stronger growth, there is no time for complacency. Structural reforms are vital to sustain the current expansion and to mitigate risks. Therefore, at this juncture of the world economy, it is truly crucial to give reforms a chance. After monetary and fiscal policies have done their jobs, it is time for reforms to sustain the expansion, to improve well-being, and to make growth work for all.

References

Economic Outlook, May 2018.

 

 

Álvaro S. Pereira, Chef économiste de l’OCDE par intérim, Département des affaires économiques

Après une longue période de croissance atone, l’activité économique mondiale croît enfin au rythme d’environ 4 %, qui correspond à la moyenne historique des dernières décennies.

C’est une bonne nouvelle, et qui apparaît encore meilleure lorsque l’on sait que ce rebond de la croissance de l’économie mondiale est, pour partie, le résultat d’un redémarrage opportun de l’investissement et des échanges mondiaux. La reprise de l’investissement mérite tout particulièrement d’être soulignée, sachant que l’avenir de l’expansion actuelle dépendra fortement de l’évolution de l’investissement.

Bien qu’anticipé depuis longtemps, le redressement de l’investissement demeure plus timide que lors des phases d’expansion passées. Il en va de même pour les échanges mondiaux, dont on attend qu’ils progressent à un rythme respectable, sans toutefois être spectaculaire, à moins que des tensions commerciales ne viennent les mettre en péril.

Cependant, contrairement à ce qui avait pu être observé précédemment, cette croissance mondiale de 4 % ne repose pas sur un accroissement des gains de productivité ou sur une évolution structurelle profonde. Cette fois, l’intensification de l’activité économique est dans une large mesure imputable au soutien procuré par les politiques monétaire et budgétaire.

Pendant de nombreuses années, la politique monétaire a été le seul levier utilisé. Durant la crise financière internationale, les banques centrales ont procédé à des réductions draconiennes des taux d’intérêt, elles ont injecté des fonds dans l’économie et acquis des actifs à un rythme sans précédent dans l’espoir de donner un coup de fouet à l’activité économique.

Dans la plupart des pays, en revanche, la politique budgétaire est restée guidée par la prudence, voire est devenue restrictive. Au demeurant, le niveau historiquement bas des taux d’intérêt offrait aux pouvoirs publics l’occasion d’employer la marge de manœuvre budgétaire dont ils disposaient pour contribuer à relancer la croissance, selon la position défendue avec force par l’OCDE en 2016. Un grand nombre de pays de l’OCDE suivent désormais ce conseil. Dans un premier temps, les États ont utilisé les ressources dégagées par la diminution des versements d’intérêts pour éviter d’avoir à comprimer les dépenses ou à augmenter les impôts. La situation économique s’améliorant, nombre d’entre eux se sont désormais engagés sur la voie d’un nouvel assouplissement budgétaire.

Maintenant que la politique monétaire commence enfin à revenir à la normale, les pouvoirs publics s’emploient à soutenir l’activité par la politique budgétaire. On peut dire que la politique budgétaire est le levier qui a désormais la faveur des pouvoirs publics : les trois quarts des pays de l’OCDE s’engagent à présent sur la voie d’un assouplissement budgétaire. La relance budgétaire est très ample dans certains pays, et moins ambitieuse dans d’autres. Pourtant, cet assouplissement budgétaire aura des répercussions importantes sur l’économie mondiale. À court terme, il renforcera la croissance. Cependant, les pays ayant connu de plus longues périodes d’expansion s’apercevront peut-être que cette relance budgétaire (lorsqu’on lui donne de l’ampleur) accentue également les tensions inflationnistes à moyen terme. Seul le temps nous dira si les gains à court terme seront contrebalancés par des effets douloureux à moyen terme. Ce qui compte, c’est que les responsables de l’action gouvernementale, au moment de choisir telle ou telle option, soient pleinement conscients de l’impact à moyen terme de leurs politiques, et ne se bornent pas à considérer uniquement les avantages à court terme de la relance budgétaire.

La forte croissance que nous observons va également de pair avec une création d’emplois vigoureuse dans de nombreuses économies. De fait, il est particulièrement satisfaisant de constater que dans la zone OCDE, le chômage devrait atteindre son plus bas niveau depuis 1980, même s’il reste élevé dans certains pays. Compte tenu de la vitalité de la création d’emplois et de l’accentuation des pénuries de main‑d’œuvre qui en résulte, nous prévoyons désormais une progression des salaires réels dans de nombreux pays. Cette hausse est encore assez timide, mais on perçoit des signes indiquant clairement que les salaires sont enfin sur une pente ascendante. Il s’agit d’une évolution importante, sachant que la crise mondiale avait eu de graves effets sur les revenus des ménages, en particulier pour les travailleurs peu qualifiés et à faible revenu.

Malgré toutes ces bonnes nouvelles, des risques assombrissent fortement les perspectives mondiales. Quels sont-ils ? D’abord et avant tout, une escalade des tensions commerciales, qui doit être évitée. N’oublions pas que, pour une part, un recours accru à des restrictions commerciales n’a rien de nouveau. La preuve en est que plus de 1 200 restrictions nouvelles ont été instituées par des pays du G20 depuis que la crise financière mondiale a éclaté en 2007. Au demeurant, comme indiqué dans le chapitre 2, parce que l’économie mondiale est beaucoup plus intégrée et interconnectée aujourd’hui que par le passé, une nouvelle escalade des tensions commerciales pourrait porter gravement atteinte à l’expansion de l’activité économique et déclencher des perturbations dans des chaînes de valeur mondiales essentielles.

Un autre risque important est lié à l’envolée des cours du pétrole. Ceux-ci ont augmenté de près de 50 % au cours de l’année écoulée. La persistance de cette tendance intensifiera les tensions inflationnistes et accentuera les déséquilibres extérieurs dans nombre de pays.

Ces dernières années, le niveau très bas des taux d’intérêt a encouragé les ménages et les entreprises à recourir à l’emprunt dans certains pays et a abouti à une surévaluation des actifs (notamment des logements et des actions) dans beaucoup d’autres. Dans ce contexte, un relèvement des taux d’intérêt pourrait mettre en difficulté les pays, les familles et les entreprises lourdement endettés. Certes, cette augmentation des taux d’intérêt a été largement anticipée et ne devrait donc pas induire de perturbations majeures. Néanmoins, si l’inflation augmente davantage que prévu et si les banques centrales sont contraintes de relever plus rapidement les taux d’intérêt, les perceptions sur les marchés pourraient s’inverser brusquement et conduire à un ajustement brutal des prix des actifs.

Une remontée plus rapide des taux d’intérêt dans les économies avancées pourrait également entraîner encore d’importants phénomènes de volatilité et de dépréciations des monnaies dans certaines économies de marché émergentes qui sont très tributaires des financements extérieurs et sont confrontées à des déséquilibres internes et externes. Les tensions géopolitiques pourraient également favoriser de brusques corrections du marché ou un nouvel essor des cours du pétrole. Le Brexit et l’incertitude autour de l’action gouvernementale qui sera menée en Italie ne font qu’ajouter aux pressions qui pèsent sur l’expansion dans la zone euro.

Que faut-il en déduire pour l’action publique ? Parce que la dette publique et la dette privée demeurent élevées dans certains pays, il est primordial de rehausser la productivité, de faire baisser les niveaux d’endettement et de constituer des marges de manœuvre budgétaires pour renforcer la résilience des économies. Étant donné que les politiques monétaire et budgétaire ne permettront pas d’alimenter indéfiniment l’expansion et pourraient même contribuer à accroître les risques financiers, il est absolument essentiel que la priorité soit donnée aux réformes structurelles. Ces dernières années, rares sont les pays qui ont engagé des réformes structurelles d’envergure. La plupart de ceux qui ont mené des réformes sont de grandes économies de marché émergentes, comme l’Argentine, le Brésil et l’Inde. Du côté des économies avancées, une importante réforme du travail a été adoptée en France et une réforme fiscale de grande ampleur est entrée en vigueur aux États-Unis. Cependant, comme souligné dans l’édition 2018 d’Objectif croissance, ces exceptions notables n’empêchent pas que les réformes ont pris du retard.

Pourquoi est-ce important ? Parce que le seul moyen d’entretenir l’expansion actuelle et de faire en sorte que la croissance bénéficie à tous consiste à entreprendre des réformes destinées à améliorer la productivité. Comme le montre l’OCDE dans de nombreux Examens des politiques nationales d’éducation et Stratégies nationales sur les compétences, il est primordial de repenser les cursus pour développer les compétences cognitives, sociales et émotionnelles indispensables à la réussite dans le monde du travail, et d’améliorer la qualité de l’enseignement ainsi que les ressources nécessaires pour favoriser une acquisition efficace de ces compétences. Dans beaucoup de pays, l’investissement dans une éducation de qualité pour les jeunes enfants ainsi que dans l’enseignement professionnel et l’apprentissage revêt une importance particulière. Il est en outre capital d’entreprendre des réformes du marché du travail propres à améliorer les compétences. Des réformes axées sur l’intensification de la concurrence, l’amélioration des régimes de faillite, l’abaissement des obstacles à l’entrée dans les secteurs de services et la simplification des procédures administratives sont aussi des ingrédients essentiels pour que nos économies deviennent plus dynamiques, plus inclusives et plus propices à l’entrepreneuriat. Les investissements dans les infrastructures numériques seront aussi fondamentaux à l’ère du numérique. Par ailleurs, il existe de vastes possibilités de réduction des coûts commerciaux sur les marchés de biens mais aussi et surtout de services, laissant entrevoir des perspectives de croissance et de création d’emplois dans le monde entier.

Malgré le regain de croissance, l’heure n’est pas à l’excès de confiance. Les réformes structurelles sont la clé de la poursuite de l’expansion actuelle et de l’atténuation des risques. C’est pourquoi, à ce point de bascule pour l’économie mondiale, il est véritablement capital de donner une chance aux réformes. Les politiques monétaire et budgétaire ayant rempli leur office, le moment est venu de faire en sorte que les réformes prennent le relais et qu’elles concourent à soutenir l’expansion, à améliorer le bien-être et à produire une croissance bénéfique pour tous.

Références

Perspectives économiques, mai 2018.