Structural reforms for more inclusive growth in Greece

by Christian Daude, Senior Economist, Office of the Chief Economist, OECD Economics Department (former head of the Greek Desk)

The Greek economy is turning around lately, but it remains in a deep depression. GDP has fallen by more than a quarter between 2007 and 2015, unemployment remains extremely high at 25 percent and anchored poverty – which measures poverty relative to its pre-crisis income level – has nearly tripled between 2007 and 2014, reaching a third of the population. According to our latest OECD Economic Outlook, growth in 2016 will be slightly negative (-0.2%) and pick up to 1.9% in 2017. Unemployment will remain high and wage growth muted.

If the upcoming negotiations with its European creditors reduce Greece’s debt burden, greater confidence and less fiscal headwinds would support investment and a stronger cyclical recovery.  However, policy makers in Greece cannot rely only on a cyclical rebound if they want to overcome the profound costs of the crisis and provide better lives for their citizens.  OECD estimates show that the prolonged depression has reduced the long-term potential growth of the Greek economy by 2 percentage points. This means that without reforms to raise investment and productivity it would be extremely difficult to achieve pre-crisis living standards in a reasonable timeframe. More importantly, unemployment would remain at very high levels, as long unemployment spells have led to significant scarring effects in the labour market (OECD, 2016).

In a recent paper, we show that Greece has implemented significant labour market reforms, but less progress has been achieved on reducing oligopoly power, on simplifying the regulatory burden and on addressing weaknesses in the public administration, due to administrative capacity constraints, weak ownership of past reform programmes and vested interests. Our estimates show that changing the mix of structural reforms towards raising competition in product markets and improving general framework conditions for doing business, could boost GDP by around 13% over the next decade if implemented fully.

Figure: Product market regulation index

Index scale 0 – 6 (least to most restrictive)

Greece struc refm

Note: The MoU scenario represents the estimated level of the PMR index under full implementation of product market reforms included in the Memorandum of Understanding of the August 2015 ESM agreement. See Daude (2016) for details.
Source: OECD (2015) Product Market Regulation database and OECD calculations.

Further product market reforms are crucial to increasing productivity and getting investment started again. Although reforms so far have moved Greece close the OECD average in restrictiveness of product markets, there is still significant room for improvement, even if the current memorandum of understanding (MoU) is fully implemented. Regulations in network sectors remain restrictive. In particular, in rail and road transport, as well as electricity and gas, a combination of public ownership, barriers to entry and a significant vertical integration create relatively high costs that undermine the competitiveness of the rest of the economy.

At the same time, reforms that improve the business climate, the functioning of the judiciary, tax administration and the overall effectiveness of the public administration are needed. The OECD is currently working together with the Greek government on several of the reforms needed. The challenges are significant, but a more balanced reform package and better implementation could not only contribute to a more inclusive recovery but also create stronger public support for reforms and greater ownership to modernise the Greek economy.


Daude, C. (2016), “Structural reforms to boost inclusive growth in Greece,” OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1303, OECD Publishing, Paris.

OECD (2016), Economic Surveys: Greece 2016, OECD Publishing, Paris.

OECD (2016), OECD Economic Outlook, OECD Publishing, Paris

The contribution of weak investment to the productivity slowdown

by Yvan Guillemette, OECD Economics Department

Concerns around weak productivity growth are everywhere these days. As the latest OECD Economic Outlook notes, since the mid-2000s, productivity growth has been markedly lower than at any other time since the 1950s. In response, the OECD has just launched the Global Forum on Productivity, an initiative to foster international co-operation between public bodies who promote productivity-enhancing policies. The goal is clear: to kick productivity growth out of the doldrums. In the long run, it drives all gains in living standards. Without it, many countries may not be able to keep the promises embedded in their social programs.

But if we are to boost productivity growth, it would help to understand why it has slowed. Recent OECD work disentangles two overlapping developments (Ollivaud, Guillemette and Turner, 2016). The first is a secular slowdown in total factor productivity growth (the efficiency with which labour and capital inputs are combined in production), which predates the crisis. This trend has continued since, but the reasons behind it are not yet well understood. The second is an abrupt slowdown in investment following the crisis. On average across the OECD and the euro area, trend productivity growth slowed by 0.4 pp per annum between 2007 and 2015, all of which is explained by slower growth in capital per worker. The same is true of most individual OECD countries (see figure).

Change in trend productivity growth between 2007 and 2015

Percentage points per year

cap sstock guilemette

Note: Because the decomposition uses an approximation, a small discrepancy sometimes occurs between the total and the sum of the two contributions.

Why has investment slowed down? A large part of the explanation is simply that weak demand and excess capacity give firms little incentive to invest. Falling investment reduces the amount of capital that workers have to work with, depressing their own productivity and the overall productive capacity of the economy, so-called potential output. The authors calculate that the demand shock associated with the financial crisis may have reduced the aggregate OECD capital stock by about 3¼ per cent and the level of potential output by more than 1% by 2015. The implied reduction in the average growth rate of the capital stock explains about half of the 0.4 pp decline in the contribution from capital deepening to trend productivity growth mentioned above for the OECD area.

Further to the demand effect, capital misallocation during the pre-crisis expansion explains why investment weakness is particularly acute in the countries that saw the biggest investment booms. In addition, many governments have cut public investment in response to deteriorating public finances. Uncertainty, lack of visibility and volatility have added to this unsavoury mix. And to cap it all, the pace of productivity-boosting structural reform has slowed.

High inertia in the capital stock means that the negative effects of the crisis on productivity could last for a while. This realisation adds to the urgency of using all available fiscal space to help stretched monetary policies boost demand, and to redouble efforts on structural reforms.


Ollivaud, P., Y. Guillemette and D. Turner (2016), “Links between weak Investment and the slowdown in productivity and potential output growth across the OECD”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1304.

OECD Economic Outlook, June 2016.


Central bank negative deposit rates and the banking sector

By Kei-Ichiro Inaba and Lukasz Rawdanowicz, Macroeconomic Policy Division, OECD Economics Department

The ECB, the Bank of Japan and five other central banks in Europe have applied negative interest rates on commercial banks’ reserves. This additional monetary policy stimulus, following large asset purchases by central banks in some of these areas, should boost the economy and thus raise inflation closer to target. However, its effectiveness may be reduced if negative interest rates undercut banks’ profits. As discussed in Box 1.2 in the latest Economic Outlook, so far these negative effects have been small but will increase in the euro area.

Negative interest rates applied to central bank reserves should lower short and longer-term market interest rates by signalling an easier monetary policy stance and encouraging banks and investors to rebalance their portfolios towards riskier assets. With unchanged monetary policy abroad, they should also weaken the domestic currency. All these effects should bolster the economy and thus banks.

However, negative interest rates may also imply direct losses for banks. The feasibility for banks to compensate these losses depends on their business models. It can be high when banks liabilities are largely in the form of inter-bank loans or bonds and stimulative monetary policy is effective in lowering market interest rates. In contrast, the feasibility will be particularly limited for banks with a large share of retail deposits. Passing negative interest rates to depositors risks widespread withdrawals when storing cash is not very costly. Thus, banks could be forced to compensate losses by raising fees and increasing, or not lowering, interest rates on loans. The chance of such an outcome, and an associated perverse impact on loan demand and growth, increases with the level and duration of negative interest rates.

So far, interest costs on banks’ funds at central banks have been limited and tiny compared to banks’ profits and the average interest rates on funds placed with the central banks are less negative than the central banks’ deposit rates (table below). This stems from various forms of exemptions (tiered reserve systems in Denmark, Japan, Norway and Switzerland; exemption for required reserves in the euro area and Japan). In Sweden, the costs are reduced as banks effectively do not use the deposit facility given that they can purchase Riksbank’s certificates or use overnight fine-tuning operations that are remunerated at less negative interest rates than the deposit rate. In Japan, banks as a whole continue to earn net positive interest income from excess reserves.

In the euro area, the cost of negative interest rates for banks is going to increase with the expansion of ECB total assets and the concomitant increase in reserves for banking sector as a whole. This will not be the case for Japan. Although the Bank of Japan intends to sustain asset purchases, the negative-interest tier has been capped at around 30 trillion yen.

EO99 Investment


OECD  (2016), OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2016, Issue 1, OECD Publishing, Paris.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco_outlook-v2016-1-en

What is the scope for public investment to lift long-term growth ?

by  Annabelle Mourougane, Jarmila Botev, Jean-Marc Fournier, Nigel Pain and Elena Rusticelli, OECD Economics Department

Long-term rates are low in OECD countries, particularly in Japan, France and Germany. This opens up fiscal space and can justify any public investment projects with a positive rate of return. At the same time, infrastructure needs are sizeable, especially as fiscal consolidation in recent years has pushed down public capital spending to very low levels in many countries. In such a situation, additional public investment is likely to benefit from high rates of return (Fournier, forthcoming).

New estimates in the June OECD Economic Outlook show long-term output gains of a budget neutral sustained investment stimulus of 0.5% of GDP could amount to between 0.5% and 2% (figure below).

Collective action among the major advanced economies to raise good-quality public investment is estimated to bring additional GDP gains. This would represent a gain of around one-half on average after the first year compared to a scenario where countries acts individually in the large advanced economies but Japan, where the gains are uncertain (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2014). Amongst the major advanced economies, Germany would benefit the most from collective action to boost public investment.
What factors affect the gains to such a stimulus (see table below)? OECD analysis points to the following country-specific factors:

  • the initial level of public capital stock and the rate of returns of these investments: Lowering returns to public capital by one standard deviation could significantly reduce the long-term effect on output, by cutting it by around 3/4. Amongst the large advanced economies, the effect on output would be above average in Germany and the United Kingdom, while the output gains can be negative for Japan.
  • the country’s initial position in the economic cycle and the extent of labour-market rigidities, which determine how far persistent demand weakness undermines the productive capacity of the economy (“hysteresis”). In Italy and France, where this hysteresis effect is stronger, the effect of public investment stimulus is stronger.
  • the additional gains structural reforms can bring to the economy: Reforms targeted at frictions that hold back demand for investment, such as increasing product market competition, can lower the opportunity costs of investing, and hence raise the catalytic impact of public investment on private capital spending. Lowering product market regulations by the average improvement over two years in a typical OECD country could add around 0.1-0.3 percentage point to the growth impact after the first year. Such gains would be sizeable in France, Italy and Canada.





Auerbach, A.J. and Y.Gorodnichenko (2014), “Fiscal Multiplier in Japan”, NBER Working Papers, No. 19911.

Botev, J. and A. Mourougane (forthcoming), “Fiscal Consolidation: What are the Breakeven Fiscal Multipliers?”, OECD Economics Department Working paper, OECD Publishing, Paris.

Fall, F. and J.M. Fournier  (2015), “Macroeconomic Uncertainties, Prudent Debt Targets and Fiscal Rules”,OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1230, OECD Publishing, Paris.

Fournier, J.M. (forthcoming), “The Positive Effect of Public Investment on Potential Growth”, OECD Economics Department Working Paper, OECD Publishing, Paris.

Mourougane, A., J. Botev, J.M. Fournier, N. Pain and E. Rusticelli (forthcoming), “Can an Increase in Public Investment Sustainably Lift Growth?”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, OECD Publishing, Paris.

Policymakers: Act now to break out of the low-growth trap and deliver on our promises

By Catherine L. Mann, OECD Chief Economist

Policymaking is at an important juncture. Without comprehensive, coherent and collective action, disappointing and sluggish growth will persist, making it increasingly difficult to make good on promises to current and future generations.

Global growth has languished over the past eight years as OECD economies have struggled to average only 2 per cent per year, and emerging markets have slowed, with some falling into deep recession. In this Economic Outlook the global economy is set to grow by only 3.3 per cent in 2017. Continuing the cycle of forecast optimism followed by disappointment, global growth has been marked down, by some 0.3 per cent, for 2016 and 2017 since the November Outlook.

The prolonged period of low growth has precipitated a self-fulfilling low-growth trap. Business has little incentive to invest given insufficient demand at home and in the global economy, continued uncertainties, and a slowed pace of structural reform. In addition, although the unemployment rate in the OECD is projected to fall to 6.2 per cent by 2017, 39 million people will still be out of work, almost 6.5 million more than before the crisis. Muted wage gains and rising inequality depress consumption growth. Global trade growth, at less than 3 per cent on average over the projection period, is well below historical rates, as value-chain intensive and commodity-based trade are being held back by factors ranging from spreading protectionism to China rebalancing toward consumption-oriented growth.

Negative feedback-loops are at work. Lack of investment erodes the capital stock and limits the diffusion of innovations. Skill mismatches and forbearance by banks capture labour and capital in low productivity firms. Sluggish trade prospects slow knowledge transfer. These malignant forces slow down productivity growth, constraining potential output, investment, and trade. In per capita terms, the potential of the OECD economies to grow has halved from just below 2 per cent 20 years ago to less than one per cent per year, and the drop across emerging markets is similarly dramatic. The sobering fact is that it will take 70 years, instead of 35, to double living standards.

The low-growth trap is not ordained by demographics or globalization and technological change. Rather, these can be harnessed to achieve a different global growth path – one with higher employment, faster wage growth, more robust consumption with greater equity. The high-growth path would reinvigorate trade and more innovation would diffuse from the frontier firms as businesses respond to economic signals and invest in new products, processes, and workplaces.

What configuration of fiscal, monetary, and structural policies can propel economies from the low-growth trap to the high-growth path, safeguarding living standards for both young and older generations?

Monetary policy has been the main tool, used alone for too long. In trying to revive economic growth alone, with little help from fiscal or structural policies, the balance of benefits-to-risks is tipping. Financial markets have been signalling that monetary policy is overburdened. Pricing of risks to maturity, credit, and liquidity are so sensitized that small changes in investor attitude have generated volatility spikes, such as in late 2015 and again in early 2016.

Fiscal policy must be deployed more extensively, and can take advantage of the environment created by monetary policy. Governments today can lock in very low interest rates for very long maturities to effectively open up fiscal space. Prioritized and high-quality spending generates the capacity to repay the obligations in the longer term while also supporting growth today. Countries have different needs and initial situations, but OECD research points to the kind of projects and activities that have high multipliers, including both hard infrastructure (such as digital, energy, and transport) and soft infrastructure (including early education and innovation). The right choices will catalyse business investment, which, as the Outlook of a year ago argued, is ultimately the key to propelling the economy from the low-growth trap to the high-growth path.

The high-growth path cannot be achieved without structural policies that enhance market competition, innovation, and dynamism; increase labour market skills and mobility; and strengthen financial market stability and functioning. As outlined in the special chapter in this Outlook, the OECD’s Going for Growth and the comprehensive Productivity for Inclusive Growth Nexus Report of the OECD Ministerial Summit, there is a coherent policy set for each country based on its own characteristics and objectives that can raise productivity, growth and equity.

The need is urgent. The longer the global economy remains in the low-growth trap, the more difficult it will be to break the negative feedback loops, revive market forces, and boost economies to the high-growth path. As it is, a negative shock could tip the world back into another deep downturn. Even now, the consequences of policy inaction have damaged prospects for today’s youth with 15 per cent of them in the OECD not in education, employment, or training; have drastically reduced the retirement incomes people are likely to get from pension funds compared to those who retired in 2000; and have left us on a carbon path that will leave us vulnerable to climatic disruption.

Citizens of the global economy deserve a better outcome. If policymakers act, they can deliver to raise the future path of output – which is the wherewithal for economies to make good on promises – to create jobs and develop career paths for young people, to pay for health and pension commitments to old people, to ensure that investors receive adequate returns on their assets, and to safeguard the planet.


OECD Economic Outlook urges policy action to promote productivity and equality

by Oliver Denk, OECD Economics Department

The Special Chapter of the OECD Economic Outlook published today shows why the global economy remains in the doldrums. Since the mid-2000s, productivity growth has been markedly lower than at any other time since the 1950s. This matters as rising productivity lies at the heart of economic progress.

The chapter also shows another unsettling trend. Income inequality has been on a steady upward rise over the past 30 years. Technological change and globalisation are likely to have put low- and medium-skilled workers at a disadvantage. On the other hand, income growth has been especially high for the top 1%.

The productivity slowdown and the rise in inequality have acted as a “double-whammy” for many workers and their families. On average across OECD countries, income of the bottom 40% in the income distribution has improved by a dismal ½ per cent per year over the past decades (adjusted for inflation). Income of the bottom 10% is effectively no higher than in 1990, a quarter-century ago.

Given these unsatisfying developments, it is no wonder that economic, social and political discontent has risen on both sides of the Atlantic. Worryingly, no fast turnaround is in sight. The global projections in our Economic Outlook, also released today, forecast only a small uptick in productivity growth for 2016-17.

How can policymakers reverse the two trends of slowing productivity and rising inequality? Many policy choices – on monetary, fiscal and structural policies – affect both productivity and inequality. They could thus tackle these twin challenges together. Ambitious, multifaceted and coherent policy actions are necessary.

Aggressive demand management will help economies return to trend productivity and employment. The downturn since 2007 has not only depressed productivity but also employment. Low-income, low-skilled workers have often been the first to lose their job. Accommodative monetary and fiscal policies work against this rise in poverty and income inequality.

Equally important, many countries have ample scope for structural policies to improve the education system, upgrade their infrastructure, facilitate the entry and exit of firms and support workers in transitioning to emerging, high-productivity jobs. Is there a one-size fits all? The chapter draws out the key general lessons, but country specificities matter as well. You can find the reform priorities tailored to each country’s circumstances in the country notes.


Promoting Productivity and Equality: A Twin Challenge

OECD Economic Outlook

The Productivity-Inclusiveness Nexus

Global Forum on Productivity

Unsatisfactory global growth:  A call to policy action!

CLM with credit press conference Interim Eco Outlook Feb 2016



by Catherine L. Mann

OECD Chief Economist and Head of the Economics Department


Welcome to the OECD Economics Department’s new ECOSCOPE blog !

Our Interim Economic Outlook launched today shows a troubling picture—world growth stuck at 3% in 2016, and only 3.3% in 2017, with substantial volatility in financial markets raising new risks.  The OECD’s mantra is “better policies for better lives”  and that is central to our assessment that a stronger policy response is urgently needed to get global growth out of this low-growth equilibrium.  Monetary stimulus alone cannot reverse many of the worrying trends seen in the Interim including weak trade, low investment and an apparent slowing of trend productivity.  Given very low interest rates, now is an opportune time for collective fiscal action, focusing  on investment spending that will raise growth in the near term and underpin long-term output potential.  Greater ambition on structural reforms to provide an environment conducive to private investment goes hand-in-hand. ( On 26 February, we will launch our annual Going for Growth assessment of structural policy needs and the progress countries are making towards achieving more productive economies with better quality jobs (details to be posted on this site)).   Monetary, fiscal, and structural policy tools are synergistic and all need to be deployed at this time.

Does the call for more fiscal action by the OECD represent a change of view ?

In a well-known phrase, Keynes wrote “When my information changes, I alter my conclusions. What do you do, sir?”.   So, what is new?

First, OECD governments have more fiscal space than they did in the immediate post-crisis period. The sovereign debt crisis has faded and the most severe banking problems have been addressed. Budget deficits have fallen in many countries following budgetary consolidation and falling interest costs. The long-term interest rate is far lower than it was 3-years ago with negative interest rates on government borrowing of a few years and the ability to raise money at longer horizons at a minimal cost.

Second, the persistent downgrade of forecasts across the economics profession in recent years raises deep questions about how the economy is operating. Some key mechanisms that drive economic recoveries seem to be not working:  wage pressures are exceptionally weak even in countries where unemployment has fallen; inequality is rising; business investment is not responding to the extraordinarily low cost of capital;  currency depreciations are not leading to robust exports;  inflation pressures seem non-existent across many economies despite exceptional monetary policy action; productivity growth and diffusion innovation appear to have slowed. The thread that runs through these disconnects is weak demand, hence the need to use all policy tools to full effect.

A scenario exercise in the Interim shows the potential growth gains, and fiscal sustainability benefits of a collective action on fiscal spending.

1st year effects of a 1/2 percent of GDP public investment stimulus by all OECD countries
Change from baseline


There are many open questions about what are the key issues facing policymakers, and how they should balance both immediate and longer-term objectives.  This blog is an opportunity to debate these topics!

We hope that windows into research by OECD economists posted on this blog will share new insights about the evidence and the ‘’better  policies” we need to ensure the ‘’better lives’’.   Please join the conversation!


Achieving prudent debt targets using fiscal rules

Interim Economic Outlook

The Future of Productivity